Florida Law Review
Volume 72

Issue 2

Article 1

Bankruptcy's Adjunct Regulator
Alexander Sickler
Kara Bruce

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Alexander Sickler and Kara Bruce, Bankruptcy's Adjunct Regulator, 72 Fla. L. Rev. 159 ().
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Sickler and Bruce: Bankruptcy's Adjunct Regulator

BANKRUPTCY’S ADJUNCT REGULATOR
Alexandra Sickler
Kara Bruce*
Abstract
This Article bridges the fields of consumer finance and bankruptcy by
presenting the first comprehensive study of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau’s potential as bankruptcy regulator. It provides an indepth picture of how the Bureau’s regulatory authority crosses over into the
consumer bankruptcy system. Based on the observations of this study, it
makes the normative case that the Bureau should adopt a more purposeful
bankruptcy-directed regulatory agenda. It provides a detailed framework for
how the Bureau could collaborate with bankruptcy’s existing regulators to
address pernicious consumer protection violations in bankruptcy. It also
observes how, in the current political climate, other regulators can capitalize
on the fruits of the Bureau’s earlier work to enhance their own effectiveness.
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INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the
Bureau) has regulated a broad swath of conduct relating to consumer
credit.1 This regulatory activity has, in several distinct ways, carried over
into consumer bankruptcy.2 The Bureau has regulated bankruptcy issues
directly, for instance by adopting rules that govern how mortgage
creditors communicate with borrowers in bankruptcy.3 But more often,
the Bureau’s impact in consumer bankruptcy is a side effect of its
oversight of debt collection and credit reporting markets.4
Although the Bureau has had meaningful impact in consumer
bankruptcy cases, few scholars or commenters have acknowledged the
role the Bureau plays in this space. Bankruptcy and consumer protection
law often operate in independent silos. Many consumer protection
advocates view bankruptcy to be a remote and specialized field, while
bankruptcy proponents tend to view bankruptcy as a complete and
exhaustive system.5 This Article bridges the fields of consumer finance
and bankruptcy by presenting the first comprehensive study of the
Bureau’s potential as bankruptcy regulator.
In several earlier articles, we explore how consumer bankruptcy’s
existing regulators struggle to respond to negative-value bankruptcy
misconduct.6 The bankruptcy system, which is premised on a litigation1. See generally SARAH JOHNSON AUCHTERLONIE & ALEXANDRA EVERHART SICKLER,
CONSUMER FINANCIAL LAW AND COMPLIANCE (BNA 2017).
2. See infra Part III.
3. See infra Section II.A.2.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See, e.g., Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 510 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating
that the Bankruptcy Code features “complex, detailed, and comprehensive provisions” that
“demonstrate[] Congress’s intent to create a whole system . . . [to] adjust all of the rights and
duties of creditors and embarrassed debtors alike” (quoting MSR Expl., Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc.,
74 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 1996))).
6. See, e.g., Kara Bruce, Closing Consumer Bankruptcy’s Enforcement Gap, 69 BAYLOR
L. REV. 479, 482–86 (2017) [hereinafter Bruce, Enforcement Gap]; Kara Bruce, The Debtor
Class, 88 TUL. L. REV. 21, 23–24 (2013) [hereinafter Bruce, Debtor Class]; Kara J. Bruce,
Vindicating Bankruptcy Rights, 75 MD. L. REV. 443, 444–46 (2016) [hereinafter Bruce,
Vindicating]; Kara J. Bruce & Alexandra P.E. Sickler, Private Remedies and Access to Justice in
a Post-Midland World, 34 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 365, 375 (2018) [hereinafter Bruce & Sickler,
Private Remedies Post-Midland]; Alexandra P. Everhart Sickler, The (Un)Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 28 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 238, 240–41 (2016) [hereinafter Sickler, Unfair Credit]. There
are multiple discrete examples of this problem. See, e.g., Kara J. Bruce, Channeling Punitive
Damage Awards Under 362(k), BANKR. L. LETTER (Thomson Reuters, St. Paul, Minn.), Apr.
2018, at 1, 2–3 [hereinafter Bruce, Channeling Under 362(k)] (discussing Bank of America’s
egregious pattern of automatic stay violations); Kara J. Bruce, Debt Buyers Beware: Filing Proofs
of Claim for Time-Barred Debt in the Eleventh Circuit and Beyond, BANKR. L. LETTER (Thomson
Reuters, St. Paul, Minn.), June 2016, at 1, 2–3 [hereinafter Bruce, Debt Buyers Beware]
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based model of regulation, relies on parties involved in a case to address
misconduct by filing objections, or commencing contested matters or
adversary proceedings.7 But much of the misconduct in bankruptcy,
standing alone, generates injuries too small to justify the professional
time and expense of combating them. As such, creditor behavior that has
a de minimis effect in an individual case can amount to a massive wealth
transfer and undermine the integrity of the bankruptcy process. 8 In this
Article, we make the case that the Bureau should adopt a more
purposefully bankruptcy-directed regulatory agenda. We provide a
detailed framework for how the Bureau could collaborate with
bankruptcy’s existing regulators to better address these pernicious
consumer protection violations.
To be sure, much of the Bureau’s regulatory potential in bankruptcy
will remain unrealized in the current political climate, under which the
Bureau exercises its authority sparingly.9 But administrations change,
and federal consumer financial laws and bankruptcy law will continue to
intersect. Thus, the observations we make regarding the scope of the
Bureau’s authority and its regulatory potential will be relevant to future
administrations. In an effort to achieve more immediate impact, this
Article concludes by examining how, at present, other regulators can use
the fruits of the Bureau’s existing work to improve compliance in
bankruptcy.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the regulatory
deficiencies that led to the Bureau’s creation and outlines, in broad
strokes, the scope of the Bureau’s authority. Part II details the full scope
of the Bureau’s regulatory authority—rulemaking, supervision, and
enforcement—and catalogs the history of Bureau activities that directly
or indirectly affect consumer bankruptcy. Part III argues that the
bankruptcy system would benefit if the Bureau pursued an intentional,
bankruptcy-focused regulatory strategy. Part IV provides a blueprint that
the Bureau might use to build this bankruptcy-focused regulatory
strategy.

(discussing debt buyers’ practice of flooding the bankruptcy system with proofs of claim for debt
for which the statute of limitations has run); Kara J. Bruce, Recent Developments in EducationalBenefit Discharge Litigation, BANKR. L. LETTER (Thomson Reuters, St. Paul, Minn.), Oct. 2018,
at 1, 2–4 [hereinafter Bruce, Educational Discharge] (discussing cases that allege student loan
servicers improperly collect discharged private student loan debt); Kara Bruce, Recent
Developments in Student Loan Non-Dischargeability: Aggregating Discharge-Violation Claims,
BANKR. L. LETTER (Thomson Reuters, St. Paul, Minn.), Jan. 2019, at 1, 2–3 [hereinafter Bruce,
Aggregating Discharge Claims] (same).
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See Bruce & Sickler, Private Remedies Post-Midland, supra note 6, at 376.
9. See infra Part IV.
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I. COMPREHENSIVE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION: THE PROMISE
OF DODD-FRANK
Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as part
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 (the Dodd-Frank Act),10 which was enacted in the wake of the 2008
global financial crisis.11 This Part explores the systemic weaknesses that
led to the Bureau’s creation and provides a broad overview of the
financial activities and industries that the Bureau oversees.
A. History of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Before the Bureau’s creation, the federal regulatory framework for
consumer financial products and services was fragmented and
duplicative.12 Several federal agencies were charged with consumer
financial protection, but none had consumer matters as its sole focus.13
On the contrary, the dominant regulators of financial services were
primarily focused on ensuring the safety and soundness of the banks that
they regulated.14 This focus overshadowed, and sometimes conflicted
with, the consumer protection missions of these agencies.15 Jurisdictional
limitations and staffing resources also hindered agencies’ ability to
address violations of federal consumer financial protection laws.16
These structural limitations engendered systemic weaknesses. For
example, the decentralized regulatory structure made the financial system
vulnerable to arbitrage. Because federal bank regulators competed to
issue bank charters (and earn the associated chartering fees), regulators
10. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 &
15 U.S.C.).
11. NICOLE VANATKO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45163, REGULATORY REFORM 10 YEARS
AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: DODD-FRANK AND SECURITIES LAW 2 (2018).
12. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 10 (2010); see also Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 327 (2013).
13. Levitin, supra note 12, at 330; see Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Consuming Debt:
Structuring the Federal Response to Abuses in Consumer Credit, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 43,
61 (2005) (explaining that the U.S. regulatory system is set up to be “institutional,” with regulators
from each industry—banking, insurance, securities, and so on—handling the consumer protection
aspects of those industries).
14. See Levitin, supra note 12, at 330.
15. Id. Indeed, safety and soundness concerns focus primarily on bank profitability, and
practices that might be deemed unfair, deceptive, and abusive can also be quite profitable. Id. at
330–31.
16. For an example of jurisdictional limitations, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had
authority to enforce the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) but lacked the authority to
issue rules under the FDCPA. See Lisa Stifler, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the
First Six Years: a Necessary Cop on the Beat, Reflections on the Fisher Memorial Program,
71 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 191, 193 (2017). In addition, before the Bureau was created,
regulatory agencies had few dedicated staffers working on consumer finance issues. See Levitin,
supra note 12, at 332.
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with laxer consumer protection rules could attract more business.17 And,
when consumer protection issues came to the fore, agencies largely failed
to react, engaging in “finger pointing” among regulators with overlapping
authority.18 At the same time, preemption doctrines seriously undermined
state regulators’ ability to serve as an effective stopgap.19
While these flaws in consumer financial regulation were no secret
leading up to the 2008 global financial crisis,20 the crisis made them
impossible to ignore. Failures in regulatory oversight and accountability
had allowed trillions of dollars in risky mortgages to be originated,
packaged, and sold to investors.21 When the mortgage bubble finally
burst, the billions of dollars in losses brought financial industry
behemoths to their knees, taking the global economy down with them.22
In the fallout from the crisis, consumers faced not only personal financial
hardship, but also procedural abuse at the hands of a financial industry
that was unequipped to handle the massive numbers of defaults its
practices had generated.23
The Dodd-Frank Act, which was enacted in 2010, sought to address
the widespread regulatory failures that led to the global financial crisis
and permitted consumers to be harmed in its wake.24 Among other things,
the Dodd-Frank Act established the Bureau to provide “a single point of
accountability for enforcing federal consumer financial laws and
protecting consumers in the financial marketplace.”25

17. Levitin, supra note 12, at 332–33 (noting that some regulators “receive the majority of
their budgets from chartering fees, rather than Congressional appropriations” and providing an
example of a “regulatory race to the bottom” over state usury laws).
18. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 168 (2010).
19. See Schooner, supra note 13, at 46.
20. For example, Elizabeth Warren, then a professor at Harvard Law School, called for the
creation of a Financial Product Safety Commission in the summer of 2007. See Elizabeth Warren,
Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY (2007), https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-atany-rate/ [https://perma.cc/5EZ2-2BMP]; see also Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making
Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008). A few years earlier, Heidi Mandanis Schooner argued
that bank regulators should not be responsible for consumer protection. See Schooner, supra note
13, at 83.
21. See Warren, supra note 20.
22. See Martin Feldstein, The Global Impact of American’s Housing Crisis, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (Aug. 2009), https://www.nber.org/feldstein/projectsyndicate082009.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J6X6-N5WS]. See generally Levitin, supra note 12 (discussing events that led to the
financial crisis and, in turn, to the subsequent creation of the Bureau).
23. See, e.g., Fact Sheet: Mortgage Servicing Statement, U.S. DEP’T HUD,
https://www.hud.gov/mortgageservicingsettlement/fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/D6YH-FF2Z]
(detailing some of the most widespread procedural abuses in the wake of the global financial
crisis).
24. See Levitin, supra note 12, at 322.
25. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2012); The Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/ [https://perma.cc/WK65-CKFF].
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The creation of the Bureau was, and remains, extremely controversial.
Opponents of the Bureau have raised a variety of concerns, including that
the aggregate costs of regulation will trickle down to consumers and put
undue pressure on small financial institutions, and that separating
financial protection from “safety-and-soundness” could upset the balance
between these two concerns.26 But the leadership structure of the Bureau
has raised the most fervent objections.27 The Bureau was designed to be
independent from regulatory capture and other political pressures.28 It is
not subject to congressional appropriations.29 Its single director is
appointed directly by the President, rather than a bipartisan committee,
and can be removed only for cause.30 Cases have challenged this structure
based on separation-of-powers concerns31 and, at the time of publication,
the United States Supreme Court is poised to rule on whether this
leadership structure is constitutional.32 The balance of this Article
proceeds on the assumption that, if the Court holds that the leadership
structure of the Bureau is unconstitutional, it will sever the offending
provisions from the remainder of the statute.33 If that is the case, then the
Court’s holding would not undermine the contributions of this Article. If
the Court takes a more aggressive approach, and disposes of the Bureau
completely, then our Article can serve as a blueprint for the development
of future consumer protection agencies.
B. The Scope of the Bureau’s Authority
In the revised regulatory landscape, the Bureau regulates almost all
consumer financial products and services markets.34 Broadly, the Bureau
has the authority to regulate “covered persons,” defined as those who
directly or indirectly offer or provide a consumer financial product or

26. See Levitin, supra note 12, at 336–38 (collecting examples of opposition to the Bureau).
27. See, e.g., id. at 337–38.
28. Id. at 337, 340.
29. Id.; cf. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a) (providing for the funding of the Bureau).
30. Levitin, supra note 12, at 340; see 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(2), (c)(1)–(3).
31. Compare, e.g., PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 80 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (en banc) (holding the CFPB’s leadership structure constitutional), with Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729, 785 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)) (holding the
CFPB’s leadership structure unconstitutional).
32. Seila Law, LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 427 (2019).
33. The Dodd-Frank Act has a severability clause, see 12 U.S.C. § 5302, which expressly
states that any provision found unconstitutional may be severed from the statute. The CFPB has
filed a brief advocating for the severability in the pending U.S. Supreme Court case. See Brief of
Respondent Supporting Vacatur at 46–48, No. 19-7, Seila Law, LLC, v. Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau at 46–48, 2019 WL 6727094 (Dec. 9, 2019).
34. See generally AUCHTERLONIE & SICKLER, supra note 1 (discussing the Bureau’s
authority in detail).
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service.35 In particular, it is the primary regulator for banking institutions
with more than $10 billion in total assets and nonbank covered persons
that offer or provide consumer financial products or services.36
The Bureau’s mission is to “implement and . . . enforce Federal
consumer financial law consistently” to ensure consumers have access to
“fair, transparent, and competitive” markets for consumer financial
products and services.37 To that end, the Bureau has sweeping authority
to regulate a majority of entities involved in the consumer financial
services industry, and, as of July 2016, Bureau enforcement activity
resulted in “over $11.4 billion in relief for more than 25 million
consumers harmed by illegal practices.”38
While the Bureau implements and enforces longstanding federal
consumer credit laws, including the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 39 the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA),40 the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),41 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA),42 the agency also has additional regulatory tools at its disposal.
It can identify and prohibit unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices,
commonly known as “UDAAPs.”43 The Bureau also has on-site
supervision and examination authority, which allows it to monitor
regulated entities’ compliance with federal consumer financial laws and
identify emergent business practices that risk harm to consumers.44
35. See 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2012). This authority extends to “related persons,” meaning
those who are in management or materially participate in the affairs of a covered person. Id.
§ 5481(25). This authority also extends to “service providers,” meaning those who provide
material services to covered persons. Id. § 5481(26). Covered persons, related persons, and
service providers are all prohibited from violating federal consumer financial law.
36. See id. §§ 5512, 5514–5515, 5563, 5564.
37. See Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1021(a), 124
Stat. 1376, 1979–80 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a)). The CFPA’s preamble also
states that among its purposes is “to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices.”
Id. at 1376.
38. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Enforcing Federal Consumer Protection
Laws, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (July 2016), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
documents/07132016_cfpb_SEFL_anniversary_factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/862P-TSV7].
39. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–
1667f (2012)).
40. Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (1974) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–
2617 (2012)).
41. Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–
1692o).
42. Pub. L. No. 91-508, tit. VI, 84 Stat. 1114, 1128 (1970) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x).
43. 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a) (making it unlawful for any person who offers or provides
consumer financial products or services (or their service providers) to engage in UDAAPs). The
Bureau also has authority to prescribe rules and bring enforcement actions to prohibit UDAAPs.
See id. § 5531(b).
44. See id. § 5531(a).
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The Bureau’s authority to regulate consumer financial matters derives
from three broad categories of law, collectively defined as “federal
consumer financial law” under the Consumer Financial Protection
Act of 2010 (CFPA).45 Federal consumer financial law46 includes the
“enumerated consumer laws,” which are eighteen federal consumer
protection statutes identified in the CFPA and listed in Table 2,47 specific
provisions of the CFPA,48 and the authorities transferred under subtitles
F and H of the CFPA.49 These sources of law are described in more detail
in Table 1. The enumerated consumer laws are listed in Table 2.

45. The Consumer Financial Protection Act appears as Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act. See
Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. X, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964-65 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491).
46. See 12 U.S.C. § 5481(14) (“The term ‘Federal consumer financial law’ means the
provisions of this title, the enumerated consumer laws, the laws for which authorities are
transferred under subtitles F and H, and any rule or order prescribed by the Bureau under this title,
an enumerated consumer law, or pursuant to the authorities transferred under subtitles F and H.”
(footnotes omitted)).
47. Id. § 5481(12). These laws, and their implementing regulations, regulate specific
activities, products, and services in the consumer financial services market, including extensions
of consumer credit of all kinds, debt collection practices, debit card transfers, overdraft services,
consumer leases, mortgage origination and appraisals, real estate settlement practices, mortgage
servicing, privacy, and credit reporting. See id.
48. Sometimes referred to as the Bureau’s “original” or “organic” authority. See Levitin,
supra note 12, at 344.
49. Subtitles F and H of the CFPA refer respectively to the transfer of consumer financial
protection functions to the Bureau and amendments to various federal statutes. See Consumer
Financial Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1061–1067, 1081–1100.
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Table 1: Sources of Bureau Authority
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION ACT
(CFPA)
• Contains the substantive provisions of Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act
• Delineates the scope of the Bureau's rulemaking, supervisory, and
enforcement authority
• Authorizes the Bureau to create rules that ban UDAAPs
ENUMERATED CONSUMER LAWS
• Eighteen federal consumer protection statutes identified in the CFPA
and listed in Table 3
• The Bureau has authority to create administrative rules, enforce these
statutes, and supervise for compliance
TRANSFERRED AUTHORITIES
• CFPA Subtitle F – transfers authority to the Bureau from other federal
regulators, including the Comproller of the Currency, Office of Thrift
Supervision, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
• CFPA Subtitle H – refers mostly to conforming amendments to
various federal statutes, such as TILA, FDCPA, among others
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Table 2: Enumerated Consumer Laws

Alternative Mortgage
Transaction Parity Act of
1982 (AMTPA)50
Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA)53
Home Owners
Protection Act of 1998
(HPA)56
Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act (GLBA)59 (only
sections 502-509)
Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act of 1974
(RESPA)62
Truth in Savings Act
(TISA)65

Consumer Leasing Act of
1976 (CLA)51
Fair Credit Billing Act
(FCBA)54
Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA)57
Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act of 1975
(HMDA)60
Secure and Fair
Enforcement (S.A.F.E.)
for Mortgage Licensing
Act of 200863
Interstate Land Sales
Full Disclosure Act66

169

Electronic Fund Transfer
Act (EFTA),52 with the
exception of Section 920
Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA),55 (with some
exceptions)
Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (FDIA)58
(only subsections (b)
through (f) of Section 43)
Home Ownership and
Equity Protection Act of
1994 (HOEPA)61
Truth in Lending Act
(TILA)64
Military Lending Act
(MLA)67

50. Pub. L. No. 97-320, tit. VIII, 96 Stat. 1469, 1545–48 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3801–3806).
51. Pub. L. No. 94-240, 90 Stat. 257 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
52. Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XX, 92 Stat. 3728 (1978) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1693–1693r (2012)).
53. Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. V, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1691, 1691a–1691c, 1691d–1691e).
54. Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. III, 88 Stat. 1511 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601, 1602, 1610, 1631, 1632, 1637, 1666, 1666a–1666j).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
56. Pub. L. No. 105-216, 112 Stat. 897 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4901–4910
(2012)).
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p.
58. Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873 (1950) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811–
1831bb).
59. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 1340 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.).
60. Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1125 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2810).
61. Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
62. Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617).
63. Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2810 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5117).
64. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f.
65. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2334 (1991) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301–
4313).
66. Pub. L. No. 90–448, 82 Stat. 590 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701–
1720 (2012)).
67. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No.
109-364, § 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (2012)).
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II. BUREAU REGULATION AND ITS SPILLOVER EFFECTS IN BANKRUPTCY
To date, the Bureau has exercised its authority in consumer
bankruptcy sparingly, only occasionally taking action to directly regulate
conduct that occurs within the bankruptcy system. More often, the agency
exercises its authority indirectly, in ways that have ripple effects in the
consumer bankruptcy system. The following sections detail the full scope
of the Bureau’s authority—rulemaking, supervisory, and enforcement—
and catalog the history of Bureau regulatory activities that have directly
or indirectly affected consumer bankruptcy. Table 3 details the scope of
the Bureau’s authority.
A. The Bureau’s Rulemaking Authority
1. In General
The Bureau has exclusive authority to prescribe rules and issue orders
and guidance to administer, implement, and enforce federal consumer
financial law.68 The Bureau can prescribe rules about many topics,
including UDAAPs,69 disclosure,70 nonbank supervision,71 nonbank
registration,72 pre-dispute arbitration,73 and reverse mortgages.74 The
Bureau can also promulgate rules that “exempt any class of covered
68. See 12 U.S.C. § 5512(a), (b)(1). If both the Bureau and another agency are authorized
to prescribe regulations under a provision of federal consumer financial law, the Bureau has
exclusive rulemaking authority. Id. § 5512(b)(4)(A).
69. Id. § 5531(b) (giving the Bureau the power to prescribe rules identifying UDAAPs); see
id. § 5536(a)(1) (prohibiting UDAAPs).
70. Id. § 5532(a).
The Bureau may prescribe [disclosure] rules to ensure that the features of any
consumer financial product or service, both initially and over the term of the
product or service, are fully, accurately, and effectively disclosed to
consumers in a manner that permits consumers to understand the costs,
benefits, and risks associated with the product or service . . . .
Id. These disclosure rules may include model forms, the use of which constitutes a “safe harbor”
for covered persons. Id. § 5532(b), (d).
71. Id. § 5514(a)(1). The Bureau may prescribe rules, in consultation with state agencies,
to facilitate supervision of nonbank covered persons, including rules to ensure such entities are
legitimate and able to perform their consumer obligations. Id. § 5514(b)(7).
72. Id. § 5512(c)(7). In consultation with state agencies, the Bureau may prescribe rules
requiring registration of certain nonbanks other than insured depository institutions and related
persons. Id.
73. Id. § 5518(b). The Bureau may prescribe rules prohibiting or restricting pre-dispute
arbitration agreements between covered persons and consumers upon finding that such rules are
“in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.” Id.
74. Id. § 5602(b)(1). The Bureau may identify and preclude unlawful, unfair, deceptive, or
abusive acts or practices in connection with reverse mortgage transactions or the offering of
reverse mortgages. Id. § 5602(b)(2).
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persons, service providers, or consumer financial products or services,
from any provision” of the CFPA or any rule issued thereunder, “as the
Bureau determines necessary or appropriate” to carry out the statute’s
objectives.75
The Dodd-Frank Act defines the scope of the Bureau’s “original”
rulemaking authority to cover nearly all consumer financial products and
services, including loan extensions and servicing, leases, deposits,
payments, debt collection, and financial advisory services.76 But while
the Bureau’s rulemaking authority is broad, it is not without limits. Each
enumerated consumer law defines the scope of the Bureau’s rulemaking
authority thereunder.77 In addition, the Bureau is subject to a number of
procedural limitations that require it to engage in a cost-benefit analysis,78
consult with prudential banking regulators,79 comply with the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)80 and the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA),81 and conduct
periodic reviews of its rules.82 Finally, the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC) has the power to veto a final Bureau rule if it determines
that the rule “would put the safety and soundness of the United States
banking system or the stability of the financial system of the United States
at risk.”83

75. Id. § 5512(b)(3)(A). The Bureau must take into consideration statutorily enumerated
factors in exercising this exemption authority, such as “the total assets of the class of covered
persons,” the volume of consumer financial transactions that the covered person conducts, and
existing provisions of applicable law. Id. § 5512(b)(3)(B)(i).
76. See id. § 5481(15)(A).
77. See supra notes 50–67 and accompanying text.
78. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(A).
79. Id. § 5512(b)(2)(B). The Bureau must consult with the appropriate prudential regulator
before proposing a rule and during the comment process. Id. If a prudential regulator objects in
writing to a proposed rule, the Bureau’s final order must describe the objection and the basis for
the Bureau’s decision about the objection. Id. § 5512(b)(2)(C).
80. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
81. Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.); see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 602–604 (requiring the Bureau to consider the economic impact of
its rules on small businesses and evaluate alternatives that would minimize any burden while
accomplishing the rule’s objectives).
82. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(d)(1). The Bureau must review every “significant” rule or order within
at least five years of its issuance. Id. § 5512(d)(1)–(2). The statute does not define the term
“significant,” apparently leaving that matter to the Bureau’s discretion.
83. Id. § 5513(a). FSOC, a Dodd-Frank Act creation, is composed of 15 federal and state
financial regulators (10 with voting power) charged with identifying, responding to, and managing
risk to the U.S. financial system. See id. § 5322(a). The FSOC’s veto authority requires a twothirds majority vote. Id. § 5323(a)(1).
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2. In Bankruptcy
To date, the Bureau’s bankruptcy-related rulemaking activity has been
limited to addressing mortgage servicers’ interactions with debtors in
bankruptcy. When a debtor files for bankruptcy relief, the automatic stay
requires creditors to halt any ongoing collection activity.84 But even so,
many debtors continue to interact with their mortgage servicers over the
course of the bankruptcy case. Most notably, debtors who file for chapter
13 bankruptcy can cure any arrears on their mortgage payments and
continue paying their mortgages on a payment plan over the course of
their case.85 Depending on the jurisdiction, debtors make these payments
through a chapter 13 trustee or directly to the creditor.86 Because many
debtors in bankruptcy continue to pay their mortgages over the course of
a bankruptcy case, the Bureau’s regulations on mortgage servicer conduct
are directly relevant to the consumer bankruptcy process.
TILA and its corresponding administrative rules, Regulation Z,
regulate the disclosure of loan terms in extending and servicing consumer
credit.87 In 2010, Congress amended TILA to require mortgage servicers
to provide periodic statements to debtors,88 and the Bureau promulgated
rules to implement this requirement.89 An earlier version of these rules
exempted debtors in bankruptcy from the periodic-statement
requirement, permitting (but not requiring) servicers to send periodic

84. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). Creditors face steep penalties if they continue to collect,
or seek to foreclose, without the authority of the court. See id. § 362(k).
85. See Gordon Bermant & Jean Braucher, Making Post-Petition Mortgage Payments
Inside Chapter 13 Plans: Facts, Law, Policy, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 261, 261–62 (2006).
86. Id. (“Some courts and chapter 13 trustees still permit chapter 13 debtors to make regular
mortgage payments directly, while in some courts, a standing order requires trustees to
make conduit payments.”). Debtors filing for chapter 7 bankruptcy have fewer options to save
their homes, but some jurisdictions will permit the mortgage to “ride through” the bankruptcy if
the debtor continues to pay the monthly amounts due. See, e.g., In re Law, 421 B.R. 735, 737
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2010); In re Caraballo, 386 B.R. 398, 400–01 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2008) (noting
that, although the Bankruptcy Abuse Protection and Consumer Protection Act abrogated the “ridethrough” option for personal property, debtors can still choose “ride-through” with respect to real
property).
87. 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2019); see 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2012) (authorizing the Bureau to
prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of TILA).
88. See Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, tit. XIV,
§ 1400, 124 Stat. 2136 (2010). The Dodd-Frank Act amended TILA to require that a creditor,
assignee, or servicer of any residential mortgage loan—a closed-end credit transaction secured by
a dwelling—provide a periodic statement to the borrower for each billing cycle. See id. § 1420(1).
The Dodd-Frank Act required the Federal Reserve Board and, subsequently, the Bureau to
prescribe standard form(s) for the required disclosure, taking into account that the statements
might be transmitted in writing or electronically. See id § 1420(2).
89. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.41(a)–(d).
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mortgage statements to debtors in bankruptcy.90 But the most recent
iteration requires mortgage servicers to send statements with bankruptcyspecific modifications to debtors in bankruptcy.91
In the process of promulgating this new rule, the Bureau considered
comments from the United States Trustee Program (USTP), industry, and
consumer advocacy groups.92 While the USTP and consumer advocacy
groups strongly supported requiring servicers to provide periodic
statements to consumers in bankruptcy, some industry commenters
argued that borrowers in bankruptcy should be exempted from the rule
based on the complexities of calculating pre-petition arrearages and
potential conflicts with the Bankruptcy Code.93 The Bureau concluded
that requiring mortgage servicers to send periodic statements to debtors
in bankruptcy was appropriate, notwithstanding the complexity, and did
not conflict with the Bankruptcy Code.94 The Bureau crafted bankruptcyspecific modifications to servicers’ requirements, which help servicers
communicate with debtors without violating the automatic stay and
discharge injunction.95
90. See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed.
Reg. 10,901, 10,966 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026) (acknowledging
industry’s concern that the automatic stay conflicts with the periodic statement requirement);
Amendments to the 2013 Mortgage Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(Regulation X) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 62,993, 63,000–06
(Oct. 23, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024, 1026) (promulgating an interim rule
exempting servicers from sending periodic statements to residential mortgage consumers who
have filed for bankruptcy pending further study of the interaction of bankruptcy law and the
periodic statements requirement).
91. See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 83 Fed.
Reg. 10,553, 10,553–54 (Mar. 12, 2018) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026). This final iteration
of the rule provides that upon a triggering event (for example, if the borrower enters bankruptcy,
personal liability is discharged, or if the borrower exits bankruptcy), the servicer is exempt from
providing the next periodic statement or coupon book that would otherwise be required, regardless
of when in the billing cycle the triggering event occurs. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.41(e)(5)(iv). As
previously drafted, the exemption applied for the next periodic statement or coupon book only if
the payment due date for that ensuing billing cycle was 14 days or less after the triggering event.
See Amendments to the 2013 Mortgage Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(Regulation X) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 81 Fed. Reg. 72,160, 72,324–26
(Oct. 19, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024, 1026).
92. See generally Amendments to the 2013 Mortgage Rules Under the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 81 Fed.
Reg. 72,160 (Oct. 19, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024, 1026).
93. Id. at 72,315.
94. See id. at 72,319–21 (noting also that the USTP “did not express concerns” that the
periodic statement requirement as proposed would violate the automatic stay).
95. The bankruptcy-specific modifications to periodic statements include omitting certain
otherwise-required disclosures—such as late payment fees, length of delinquency, the potential
risks of failing to cure a delinquency—and the addition of other new disclosures for borrowers
who have filed bankruptcy—such as pre-petition arrearage, etc. See generally Amendments to the
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The Bureau also promulgated new regulations that require creditors to
give notice of rate changes to borrowers holding adjustable rate
mortgages (ARMs). The regulations generally require creditors to notice
rate changes between 210 and 240 days before the first rate adjustment,
and between 60 and 120 days for subsequent rate adjustments.96
Meanwhile, the Bankruptcy Rules require creditors to give debtors notice
of payment changes within 21 days before the payments at the adjusted
rate are due.97 During the notice and comment period, the Bureau
received a comment suggesting that borrowers in bankruptcy should be
excepted from the new ARM notice regulations because the regulations
conflicted with the 21-day notice present in the Bankruptcy Rules.98 The
Bureau disagreed, noting that the earlier notice requirements “enhance[]
consumer protection by providing these consumers with additional time
to adjust to an increase in their mortgage payments.”99
The Bureau’s effort to adjust for the bankruptcy implications of its
mortgage servicing regulations represents a policy shift in consumer
financial regulation. Before Dodd-Frank, most mortgage servicing
regulations avoided potential conflicts with bankruptcy by crafting
expansive exceptions for creditor communications with debtors in
bankruptcy.100 But as discussed elsewhere in this Article, such broad
exceptions can undermine the value of consumer protection for debtors,
a particularly vulnerable class of consumers. These examples illustrate
how the Bureau now strives to harmonize its goals—here, improving
consumers’ access to information—while complying with the statutory
and procedural limitations supplied by bankruptcy law.
B. The Bureau’s Supervision & Examination Authority
1. In General
The Bureau has broad supervisory authority over banking institutions
with assets over $10 billion101 as well as nonbank mortgage originators

2013 Mortgage Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) and the
Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 81 Fed. Reg. 72,160. There are also different disclosures
required depending on whether the borrower filed a chapter 7 or 13 case. Id.
96. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.20(c), (d).
97. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002.1(b).
98. Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg.
10,901, 10,923 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026).
99. Id.
100. See John Rao, New Servicing Regulations Adopt Sensible Approach, AM. BANKR. INST.
J., May 2013, at 16, 16.
101. 12 U.S.C. § 5515(a) (2012). In measuring the assets of a banking institution, this
provision includes affiliates. Id.
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and servicers,102 payday lenders,103 and private student lenders of all
sizes.104 It also supervises larger participants of other consumer financial
markets, including consumer debt collection businesses,105 consumer
reporting agencies,106 student loan servicers,107 international money
transfers,108 and automobile finance companies.109
The Bureau conducts its supervisory activities using an examination
process that emphasizes compliance and risk monitoring.110 Most
examinations focus on the quality of the institution’s compliance
management systems, which should be designed to prevent violations and
ensure appropriate self-monitoring, correction, and remediation where
violations have occurred.111 The Bureau also uses examination to detect
emergent practices and assess risks of harm to consumers and markets.112
The Bureau publishes on its website a detailed Supervision and
Examination Manual (Examination Manual) that functions as a guide for
examiners and regulated entities.113 This manual exceeds 1,500 pages and
includes product- and statute-based examination guides.114 Although it is
designed for use by the Bureau’s examiners, it also serves as a blueprint
for regulated entities to measure their compliance.
Although the examination process is confidential,115 the Bureau
periodically publishes on its website Supervisory Highlights, which

102. Id. § 5514(a)(1)(A).
103. Id. § 5514(a)(1)(E).
104. Id. § 5514(a)(1)(D).
105. 12 C.F.R. § 1090.105(b).
106. Id. § 1090.104(b).
107. Id. § 1090.106(b).
108. Id. § 1090.107.
109. Id. § 1090.108.
110. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5514(b)(1)(A)–(B), 5515(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).
111. The Bureau has an internal “playbook” that explains the examination process, including
how decisions are made, who makes them, and how information is evaluated. Letter from Raynell
D. Lazier, FOIA Manager, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to Jonathan Pompan, Venable LLP
(Mar. 31, 2017), https://connect.venable.com/13/449/uploads/cfpb-examination-playbook-3-312017.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6GK-JSZ9]. Venable LLP attorneys obtained a copy of this
playbook through a Freedom of Information Act Request. Id. For an extensive discussion of the
Bureau’s examination process, see generally Jean Braucher & Angela Littwin, Examination as a
Method of Consumer Protection, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 33 (2016).
112. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5514(a)–(b), 5515(b)(1), 5516.
113. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION
M ANUAL (2012), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_
supervision-and-examination-manual.pdf. [https://perma.cc/CJT2-68CB].
114. See id. The manuals for individual products and services and statutes are here:
Supervision and Examinations, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumer
finance.gov/policy-compliance/guidance/supervision-examinations/ [https://perma.cc/F2EQ-5WXB].
115. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1070.2(f), 1070.40–.47 (2019) (addressing the confidentiality of
supervision).
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report important examination findings to help the industry identify
marketplace risks and ensure compliance.116
2. In Bankruptcy
The Bureau has identified several high-risk markets as priorities for
examination, including mortgage servicing, third-party debt collection,
credit reporting, and payment processing.117 These markets have
significant overlap in consumer bankruptcy cases.118 The following
examples explain how the Bureau’s supervision of these areas touches
bankruptcy-related activities. Although the full details of the Bureau’s
supervision are not publicly available, these overlaps show that Bureau
examiners are well positioned to identify behavior that might pose a risk
to the consumer bankruptcy process.
a. Mortgage Servicing Oversight
As noted above, debtors often continue to pay their mortgage
obligations over the course of a pending bankruptcy case. 119 As such,
mortgage creditors must build bankruptcy compliance into their
operations. This task can be onerous, as the bankruptcy process often
alters both the status of a debtor’s loan and the schedule and amount of
future payments.120 In particular, chapter 13 bankruptcy permits debtors
to cure home mortgage arrearages and continue paying their mortgages
pursuant to the terms of the chapter 13 plan.121 Mortgage creditors must
therefore be attuned to court orders and plan provisions, which supplant
any pre-bankruptcy accounting records that the servicer maintained.122
Mortgage creditors must also comply with a variety of additional
Bankruptcy Code provisions and procedural rules, including taking care
not to violate the automatic stay, and disclosing changes in payments or
other fees and amounts due.

116. See Supervisory Highlights, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.
consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/guidance/supervisory-highlights/ [https://perma.cc/
MS88-JY83].
117. See id.
118. See id.; supra notes 101–21 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
120. But see John Rao, Servicing of Home Mortgages in Bankruptcy: When Worlds Need
Not Collide, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2009, at 1, 1 (“While there are some unique payment
application issues that arise when a mortgage default is cured in a chapter 13 case, even these are
similar to servicers’ handling of payments under nonbankruptcy repayment and modification
agreements.”).
121. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (2012) (detailing a statutory right to cure).
122. If mortgage creditors fail to pay attention to these issues, they risk violating not only
the Bankruptcy Code, but RESPA as well. See Rao, supra note 120, at 1.
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The Bureau’s examination manual for mortgage servicing makes
several express references to bankruptcy.123 For example, the manual
directs examiners to obtain information about whether mortgage
servicers have internal policies and procedures that identify accounts as
being active in bankruptcy, in order to ensure that servicers comply with
bankruptcy laws and procedural rules.124 It also includes provisions that
cover chapter 13 notice of payment changes and other fees and amounts
due.125 Finally, the manual requires examiners to obtain information
about whether and how servicers apply payments received from
consumers or bankruptcy trustees.126 To date, this supervision has
uncovered significant payment processing non-compliance in bankruptcy
cases affecting borrowers in bankruptcy, leading the Bureau to
commence an enforcement action against the nation’s largest nonbank
mortgage loan servicer.127
b. Debt Collection Oversight
Consumer debt is regularly collected by entities other than the creditor
that originated the transaction. Creditors often outsource collection to
third-party debt collection agencies or sell past-due debts to debt
buyers.128 When debts are assigned, debt collectors need several pieces
of information in order to comply with the bankruptcy process. For
example, debt collectors should know if a debt is in bankruptcy or has
been discharged in bankruptcy.129 They also should be able to determine
whether the statute of limitations has run. As discussed in more detail
below, rampant failures to provide sufficient information with the
assignments of debts have led to significant problems in consumer
bankruptcy cases.130
The Bureau has authority to supervise larger participants in the debt
collection market, defined as any entity that collects more than $10
123. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, EXAMINATION PROCEDURES: MORTGAGE SERVICING
23–24 (2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/11.5_
Mortgage_Servicing_Exam_Procedures_June_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/PYU8-FKGL].
124. See id. at 23.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 24.
127. We discuss this case in more detail below. See infra notes 177–180 and accompanying
text.
128. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBTBUYING INDUSTRY (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/structureand-practices-debt-buying-industry/debtbuyingreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/J42Y-P5XM]
(detailing the scope of the debt-buying industry).
129. Some debt buyers focus their activity on collecting debts in bankruptcy. See id. at 18.
130. See id. at 29 (discussing rampant failure in documentation accompanying sold debt in
general). As discussed below, the collection of time-barred debt in consumer bankruptcy has
received a great deal of attention in recent years.
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million annually.131 Thus, collection agencies, debt buyers, and attorneys
earning more than $10 million in annual receipts from collection-related
activities on consumer financial products and services are subject to the
Bureau’s examination process.132 The Bureau’s examination manual for
debt collection (Debt Collection Manual) focuses on ensuring that these
“larger participant” debt collectors have compliance management
systems in place to prevent specific violations, and directs examiners to
inquire and obtain information about a range of debt collection issues that
are relevant to bankruptcy.133 For example, the Debt Collection Manual
directs the examiner to determine whether a supervised entity has policies
and procedures in place to identify and properly handle time-barred
debt.134 Related to debt sellers and buyers, the Debt Collection Manual
directs examiners to inquire whether a seller conveys to the buyer
sufficient and accurate information about the transferred accounts.135
The Debt Collection Manual also wraps in the Bureau’s official
guidance on debt-collection UDAAPs.136 That guidance states that
certain practices that would violate the FDCPA would likewise violate
the UDAAP ban when creditors not subject to the FDCPA commit
them.137 Examples include collecting debts or any additional debt-related
amounts (such as interest, fees, and charges) that aren’t “expressly
authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law,”
failing to timely or properly credit a consumer’s account with payments,
or “[f]alsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of the
debt.”138
131. 12 C.F.R. § 1090.105 (2019).
132. In 2012, the Bureau estimated that 175 firms representing 63% of industry revenues
would fall within the scope of the rule. See CFPB Proposes Rule to Supervise Larger Participants
in Consumer Debt Collection and Consumer Reporting Markets, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION
BUREAU (Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumerfinancial-protection-bureau-proposes-rule-to-supervise-larger-participants-in-consumer-debtcollection-and-consumer-reporting-markets-2/ [https://perma.cc/382C-C4HC].
133. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Examination Procedures: Debt Collection,
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201210_cfpb_debt-collection
-examination-procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL43-JLZC]. More specifically, the Debt
Collection Manual directs examiners to determine whether the entity sues or threatens to sue on
such debt, demands payment on such debt through litigation, and what representations, if any, the
entity makes in its written and oral communications with consumers regarding the time-barred
nature of the debt and its ability to sue on the debt. Id.
134. See id. at 29.
135. See id. at 8–9.
136. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. NO. 2013-07, PROHIBITION
OF UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES IN THE COLLECTION OF CONSUMER DEBTS
(July 10, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201307_cfpb_bulletin_unfair-deceptiveabusive-practices.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR98-328V].
137. See id. at 2.
138. See id. at 5.
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Although the full scope of the Bureau’s bankruptcy-related
examination findings are confidential, recent supervisory highlights shed
some light on the fruits of the Bureau’s supervision over bankruptcy
matters. One Supervisory Highlights reported that Bureau examiners
found that a debt seller sold thousands of dollars in debt accounts with
improper information due to widespread coding errors.139 Among the
consequences of the coding errors was the failure to note that the accounts
were in bankruptcy, which undermined the debt buyer’s ability to comply
with the Bankruptcy Code.140 The examiners determined this practice was
an “unfair” act or practice under the UDAAP.141
Multiple issues of Supervisory Highlights indicated that supervised
entities inaccurately told borrowers that student loans are not
dischargeable in bankruptcy.142 The Bankruptcy Code provides that
certain student loans may be dischargeable in bankruptcy if the debtor
demonstrates that repayment would impose an undue hardship, a standard
that is a matter of case law development.143 Moreover, a number of courts
have held that the Code exempts certain for-profit student loans from the
scope of nondischargeability.144 Examiners concluded that the inaccurate
statements were deceptive because they may mislead struggling
borrowers to conclude that bankruptcy is not a feasible choice.145

139. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUMMER SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS 6–7 (2016),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/Supervisory_Highlights_Issue_12.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5YPV-XE4J].
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FALL SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS 23–24 (2015),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201510_cfpb_supervisory-highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7DAQ-QCJS]; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FALL SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS 17 (2014),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201410_cfpb_supervisory-highlights_fall-2014.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X289-DYWV].
143. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012); Brunner v. N.Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d
395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987).
144. See generally Bruce, Educational Benefit Discharge Litigation, supra note 6 (collecting
authority).
145. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 142, at 23–24.
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c. Credit Reporting Oversight
Consumer bankruptcy intersects with credit reporting from the filing
of a case to well after a debtor receives his or her discharge. The filing of
a bankruptcy case is noted on the public records section of a debtor’s
credit report.146 A credit report indicates any discharge received for the
bankruptcy and the accounts included in that discharge.147 Finally, a
bankruptcy notation remains on a credit report for seven years in chapter
13 cases and ten years for chapter 7 cases, measured from the filing
date.148
Among the FCRA’s primary goals are fairness and accuracy in credit
reporting.149 Inaccuracies in reporting bankruptcy-related matters
implicate FCRA violations as well as automatic stay and discharge
violations. In the past, creditors were notorious for failing to update
consumer accounts with credit bureaus to reflect that debts had been
discharged in bankruptcy.150 Instead, they reported such debts as
“charged off,” late, or delinquent, or as having a balance due. Such a
practice may violate FCRA151 and bankruptcy’s discharge injunction.152

146. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(d)(1) (2012).
147. See id. § 1681c(a)(4).
148. See id. § 1681c(a)(1), (4).
149. Id. § 1681(a).
150. See, e.g., Credit One Fin. v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 553 B.R. 221, 225 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) (alleging a failure to change status of debt from charged off to discharged in bankruptcy),
aff’d, 884 F.3d 382 (2d Cir. 2018); Haynes v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. (In re Haynes), No. 1123212 (RDD), 2014 WL 3608891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014) (alleging a failure to correct
credit reports to list debts as discharged in bankruptcy rather than charged off); Bruce v. Citigroup
Inc. et al. (In re Bruce), Adv. No. 14-08224 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (same); Complaint at 1–2, Belton
v. GE Capital Consumer Lending, Inc. (In re Belton), No. 12-23037, 2015 WL 6163083 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2015) (alleging systemic practice of violating discharge injunction by
attempting to collect discharged debt and by failing to furnish updated data to credit reporting
agencies that such debts were discharged in bankruptcy), vacated, 2019 WL 1017293 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 4, 2019); see also Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Debts Canceled by Bankruptcy Still Mar
Consumer Credit Scores, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014, 9:45 PM) [hereinafter Silver-Greenberg,
Debts Canceled by Bankruptcy], https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/debts-canceled-bybankruptcy-still-mar-consumer-credit-scores/ [https://perma.cc/7UBU-SU5F]. Some of the
defendant banks settled this litigation without admitting liability and agreed to ensure bankruptcy
discharges were properly noted on credit reports. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Bank of America and
JPMorgan Chase Agree to Erase Debts from Credit Reports After Bankruptcies, N.Y. TIMES
(May 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/08/business/dealbook/bank-of-america-andjpmorgan-chase-agree-to-erase-debts-from-credit-reports-after-bankruptcies.html [https://perma.
cc/Z4EZ-EJ39].
151. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a).
152. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2012). A bankruptcy discharge “operates as an injunction against
the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect,
recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of
such debt is waived.” Id.
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The Bureau’s authority to supervise FCRA compliance is critical
because individual consumers are limited in their ability to force creditors
to correct inaccuracies.153 First, consumers do not have an unqualified
private right of action to enforce FCRA against creditors and other
entities that furnish information to credit bureaus.154 FCRA simply
requires that these entities report accurate information to the credit
bureaus, making updates or corrections as needed.155 And the Bureau’s
FCRA regulations instruct furnishers to handle any direct consumer
disputes.156 But these duties—to report accurate information and respond
to direct disputes—are enforced against furnishers exclusively through
public regulators.157 Second, some bankruptcy courts have been reluctant
to conclude that the failure to update a credit report is a violation of the
discharge injunction unless there is an additional showing that the
purpose or effect of the failure to update is to collect the discharged debt,
or that the failure to update negatively impacts on the debtor’s ability to
obtain credit, a job, or insurance.158

153. See generally Sickler, Unfair Credit, supra note 6 (discussing current challenges to the
FCRA’s enforcement regime and possible ways to restructure FCRA enforcement).
154. Consumers do not have a FCRA private right of action against a furnisher for reporting
false information. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) (enumerating furnishers’ duties to report accurate
information); id. § 1681s-2(c), (d). But they may sue a furnisher for the negligent or willful breach
of its investigation obligations as long as they have first disputed information on their report with
a credit bureau. Id. § 1681s-2(b); id. § 1681n (willfulness); id. § 1681o (negligence) (enumerating
furnishers’ duties to investigate reports of inaccuracies); see also Felts v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
893 F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2018) (recognizing that consumers have a private right of action
against furnishers for a violation of § 1681s–2(b), which requires furnishers to conduct an
investigation following notice of a dispute); Chiang v. Verizon New England Inc., 595 F.3d 26,
36 (1st Cir. 2010). To maintain such a claim, a consumer must show facts that show the furnisher’s
investigation of disputed credit information was unreasonable. See, e.g., Johnson v. MBNA Am.
Bank, NA, 357 F.3d 426, 430–31 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that FCRA requires a furnisher to
conduct a reasonable investigation of its records to resolve disputes). In addition, consumers can
enforce FCRA against the credit bureaus. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681i, 1681n, 1681o, 1681s-2;
see also Sickler, Unfair Credit, supra note 6, at 238–42 (providing an example of the statute’s
flaws in this respect).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a); see also Sickler, Unfair Credit, supra note 6, at 242–51.
156. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1022.40–43 (2019); see also Sickler, Unfair Credit, supra note 6, at 282–
89.
157. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., In re Zine, 521 B.R. 31, 40 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2014); Giles v. James B. Nutter
& Co. (In re Giles), 502 B.R. 892, 903 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013); Montano v. First Light Fed. Credit
Union (In re Montano), 488 B.R. 695, 711–12 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013); Reeves v. Gateway Credit
Card Plan (In re Reeves), 369 B.R. 338, 339 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007); Bruno v. Peoples Nat’l
Bank (In re Bruno), 356 B.R. 89, 92 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Goodfellow, 298 B.R. 358,
362 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2003); Mayer v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Mayer), 254 B.R. 396, 398
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000).
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At least one issue of Supervisory Highlights flags a number of
violations involving bankruptcy-related credit reporting.159 First,
examiners found that undisclosed creditors failed to provide investigation
“result letters” to consumers in bankruptcy who had directly disputed
information on their credit reports.160 Due to a “system error,” the letters
were coded as barred by the automatic stay and not sent.161 Second,
examiners found that certain creditors provided consumer information to
credit bureaus about a debtor’s bankruptcy status “while knowing or
having reasonable cause to believe that the information was
inaccurate.”162 Finally, some creditors “failed to report accurate dates of
first delinquency on accounts when consumers who had been delinquent
filed for bankruptcy.”163
d. Summary
The publicly available information on the Bureau’s supervisory
activity does not detail how closely examiners watch for bankruptcy noncompliance. It is clear, however, that the Bureau has the power to
examine for bankruptcy-related misconduct, and that its examination
activities have uncovered significant bankruptcy non-compliance to date.
In Part IV, this Article considers how these examination efforts,
combined with the Bureau’s other information-gathering tools, could
provide valuable information to the bankruptcy process.164
C. The Bureau’s Enforcement Authority
1. In General
The Bureau has authority to enforce a variety of federal consumer
financial laws165 for banking institutions with assets over $10 billion166
and nonbank covered persons.167 The Bureau shares this latter authority

159. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, WINTER SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS 17–19 (2017),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201703_cfpb_Supervisory-HighlightsConsumer-Reporting-Special-Edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/UCT3-ZTQL].
160. See id. at 19–21.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 17–19.
163. See id. Specifically, when consumers filed for bankruptcy, one or more furnishers
updated the date of first delinquency to reflect the date of bankruptcy filing, which is incorrect.
Id.
164. See infra Part IV.
165. See 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a) (2012).
166. See id. § 5515(a)–(c).
167. See id. § 5514(a)–(c).
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with the Federal Trade Commission, and the agencies divide the authority
according to a memorandum of understanding.168
The Bureau exercises its enforcement authority through
investigations,169 administrative adjudications,170 and civil litigation.171 It
can also negotiate and enter into administrative or civil court consent
orders.172 The Bureau has a wide range of remedies at its disposal,
including rescission or reformation of contracts, refunds or returns of
money or real property, restitution, disgorgement or compensation for
unjust enrichment, payment of damages, civil monetary penalties, and
injunctive relief.173 The CFPA permits civil monetary penalties,174 which
complement any relief available under the enumerated statutes. The
Bureau can impose penalties up to $5,000 per day for simple violations,
up to $25,000 per day for reckless violations, and up to a $1,000,000 per
day for knowing violations.175 When imposing penalties, the Bureau or a
court must consider the defendant’s size and financial resources, the
seriousness of the violation(s), the severity of risk or harm to consumers,
any history of violations, and other matters as justice requires.176
2. In Bankruptcy
On several occasions, the Bureau has exercised its enforcement
authority to regulate mortgage servicers for bankruptcy-related conduct.
For instance, the Bureau has twice sued a large nonbank mortgage
servicer, Ocwen Financial Corporation, and its subsidiaries, for violations
of federal consumer financial laws and consumer bankruptcy laws. The
Bureau, forty-nine states, and the District of Columbia filed the first
lawsuit in 2013, alleging that Ocwen violated the states’ unfair and
deceptive acts and practices laws and the CFPA, among other laws.177
That lawsuit settled the same year, with Ocwen agreeing to implement
internal policies and procedures to ensure compliance with bankruptcy
law when filing proofs of claim, motions for relief from stay, and other
168. See id. § 5514(c)(3)(A). See generally, FED. TRADE COMM’N, MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU AND THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/120123ftc-cfpb-mou.pdf. [https://
perma.cc/8XH9-T575].
169. 12 U.S.C. § 5562(a).
170. Id. § 5563. Alternatively, the Bureau may conduct an administrative adjudication before
an administrative law judge under the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
171. 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a), (f).
172. See id.
173. Id. §§ 5564(a), 5565(a)(2).
174. Id. § 5565(c)(1).
175. See id. § 5565(c)(2). The penalties are not adjusted for inflation.
176. See id. § 5565(c)(3).
177. Complaint at 8, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-02025RMC (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2013).
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documents.178 More recently, the Bureau sued Ocwen again based on
“substantial evidence” that Ocwen engaged in significant and systemic
misconduct at nearly every stage of the mortgage servicing process,
including improperly processing and applying payments for loans in
bankruptcy.179 The Bureau alleges that Ocwen’s mortgage servicing
platform was deficient in several ways that harmed consumer debtors.180
This Article explains the Bureau’s allegations against Ocwen in more
detail in Part III.
Although this particular enforcement action remains pending, the
Bureau’s efforts illustrate its potential to serve as an adjunct regulator in
consumer bankruptcy. The Bureau used its ongoing supervision of
Ocwen’s actions to identify business practices that harm debtors in the
consumer bankruptcy system. It leveraged this information to launch an
enforcement action targeting the illegal conduct. As indicated below,
bankruptcy courts are largely limited to addressing conduct within the
individual case as opposed to system-wide behavior.181 Using the
Bureau’s enforcement powers to directly target a particular market
actor’s bankruptcy-related violations spares the use of bankruptcy
resources to detect and remedy this behavior on a case-by-case basis.
Some of the Bureau’s enforcement actions against debt sellers and
debt buyers highlight the potential for indirect consumer bankruptcy
effects. For example, the Bureau has settled enforcement actions against
debt sellers with consent orders that regulate the assignment and transfer
of charged-off debts that are sold to bulk debt buyers.182 In one such case,
the consent order settling the litigation required the defendant to
accurately document the debt it sells and provide certain account
documents such as the credit agreement and recent account statements.183
The consent order also barred the defendant from selling debts if it cannot
provide documentation, if consumers allege in writing that they do not
owe the amount claimed, or if the account is within 150 days of the end
of the statute of limitations.184 The documentation and verification
requirements may improve the quality of data accompanying the sale of

178. See generally Consent Judgment, Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-02025-RMC
(detailing various policies and procedures the settlement required Ocwen to implement).
179. See Complaint at 1, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 9:17-CV80495-KAM, 2017 WL 1408216 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2017).
180. See id. at 14–18.
181. See infra Part III.
182. See generally, e.g., Consent Order, In re Citibank, N.A., No. 2016-CFPB-0003
(detailing the new procedures and requirements that must be followed as a result of statutory
violations).
183. Id. at 10–11.
184. Id. at 12.
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these debts, which should in turn improve debt buyers’ ability to comply
with bankruptcy law and applicable procedural rules.185
Additionally, the Bureau’s actions against large-volume debt buyers,
particularly Encore Capital Group and Portfolio Recovery Associates,186
were resolved by consent orders that bar these creditors from suing or
threatening to sue to collect on time-barred debt.187 The order also bars
creditors from sending demand letters on such debt unless they disclose
to consumers that they can’t sue to collect it.188 Although the consent
orders do not expressly mention bankruptcy, they are drafted in expansive
terms that could encompass the collection of debts in bankruptcy. And as
such, the consent orders might help address remedial gaps we have
identified in other writings.189

185. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provide:
(3) Claim Based on an Open-End or Revolving Consumer Credit Agreement.
(A) When a claim is based on an open-end or revolving consumer credit
agreement . . . a statement shall be filed with the proof of claim, including all of
the following information that applies to the account: (i) the name of the entity
from whom the creditor purchased the account; (ii) the name of the entity to
whom the debt was owed at the time of an account holder’s last transaction on
the account; (iii) the date of an account holder’s last transaction; (iv) the date of
the last payment on the account; and (v) the date on which the account was
charged to profit and loss.
(B) On written request . . . the holder of a claim based on an open-end or
revolving consumer credit agreement shall . . . provide the requesting party a
copy of the writing specified in paragraph (1) of this subdivision.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(c)(3).
186. According to the Bureau, these companies were the two largest bulk debt purchasers as
of 2015. See CFPB Takes Action Against the Two Largest Debt Buyers for Using Deceptive
Tactics to Collect Bad Debts, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Sept. 9, 2015),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-the-two-largest
-debt-buyers-for-using-deceptive-tactics-to-collect-bad-debts/ [https://perma.cc/97VC-NDWB].
187. See Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0023; Encore Capital
Grp., Inc., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0022.
188. See Portfolio Recovery Assocs., No. 2015-CFPB-0023, at 38–39; Encore Capital Grp.,
No. 2015-CFPB-0022, at 38–39.
189. See, e.g., Bruce & Sickler, Private Remedies Post-Midland, supra note 6, at 369–70
(describing how debt buyers have inundated the bankruptcy system with proofs of claim for debt
for which the applicable statute of limitations has run, which capitalizes on the likelihood that
some of these claims will pass through the bankruptcy process without an objection).
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3. The Bureau’s Amicus Strategy
The Bureau regularly submits amicus briefs in cases that involve the
interpretation of statutes under its authority.190 These efforts aim to
achieve a correct and consistent interpretation of these statutes by the
Supreme Court and federal circuit courts.191 In some cases, the Bureau
files briefs independently, while in others, the Bureau submits a brief in
conjunction with other federal agencies.192
At times, the Bureau’s amicus strategy encompasses matters that have
direct bearing on consumer bankruptcy cases.193 For example, the Bureau
recently joined the Office of the Solicitor General and the Executive
Office for United States Trustees in an amicus brief filed in Midland
Funding, LLC v. Johnson.194 In that case, the Supreme Court considered
whether the practice of filing proofs of claim for time-barred debt
violated the FDCPA, and whether the FDCPA can be invoked in
consumer bankruptcy cases.195 The amici, writing together as the United
States, argued that the practice of filing proofs of claim for time-barred
debt was “unfair” and “misleading” under the terms of the FDCPA, and
that the Bankruptcy Code did not preclude application of the FDCPA to
the dispute.196
Midland Funding had the potential to affect the consumer bankruptcy
process in several key ways. Most obviously, the availability of the
FDCPA to address the practice of filing time-barred debt claims was
190. See Amicus Program, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumer
finance.gov/policy-compliance/amicus/ [https://perma.cc/5AGJ-DJAR] (expressing the CFPB’s
policy on submitting amicus briefs and providing a list of recent cases in which the Bureau
submitted amicus briefs).
191. See id.
192. Compare, e.g., Brief for Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellants at 1, Regions Bank v. Legal Outsource PA, 936 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2019)
(No. 17-11736) (demonstrating a brief filed independently), with Brief for Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau & Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 1,
Rivera v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14356 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2016)
(No. 16-7008) (demonstrating a brief filed in conjunction with the Federal Trade Commission).
193. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8,
Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2016) (No. 16-348) (addressing whether the
FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy for a debt that is
time-barred).
194. 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2016); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, supra note193, at 1.
195. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at I, Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (No. 16348) (“Questions Presented [on certiorari:] 1. Whether the filing of an accurate proof of claim for
an unextinguished time-barred debt in a bankruptcy proceeding violates the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act. 2. Whether the Bankruptcy Code, which governs the filing of proofs of claim in
bankruptcy, precludes the application of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to the filing of an
accurate proof of claim for an unextinguished time-barred debt.”).
196. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 193,
at 8–9.
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directly relevant to the debtors’ remedial options when such claims were
filed in their bankruptcy cases.197 This issue also raised the broader
question of which party in a bankruptcy case—the debtor, the trustee, or
the creditor that filed the claim—should bear the burden of policing stale
debt claims.198 A host of creditor associations submitted amicus briefs
that argued that imposing FDCPA liability would, in essence, place the
burden of asserting statute-of-limitations defenses on the filing creditor,
in contravention to the text of the Bankruptcy Code.199 The Supreme
Court agreed with these arguments, and now that the FDCPA has been
removed as a remedy, the bankruptcy system has struggled to address the
regulatory gap that remains.200 The Supreme Court ultimately did not
resolve the second question presented in Midland Funding: whether the
Bankruptcy Code precludes application of the FDCPA to bankruptcyrelated FDCPA violations. Yet if the Court later decides that the FDCPA
does not apply in bankruptcy, it would gut the applicability of a host of
federal statutes that are regularly asserted in consumer bankruptcy cases.
The majority of the Bureau’s amicus briefs do not have such direct
connections with bankruptcy. Nevertheless, because many federal
consumer protection statutes can be invoked in bankruptcy cases, the
Bureau’s attempts to refine the interpretation of these statutes can have
ripple effects in consumer bankruptcy. For example, the Bureau filed an
amicus brief in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,201 a recent Supreme Court case
that considered the extent of injury necessary for Article III standing to
assert a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). 202 More
recently, the Bureau submitted an amicus brief in Johnson v. Admiral
Investments, LLC,203 a case that considered standing to bring an FDCPA
claim after Spokeo.204 Johnson also involved whether a “competent
attorney” standard should apply to FDCPA claims involving
communications sent to a consumer represented by counsel.205 Although
neither of these cases directly involved bankruptcy issues, both cases
have broad relevance for consumers who bring claims under a wide range
of federal consumer protection statutes. Creditors may frequently violate
federal consumer protection statutes including FCRA, the FDCPA, and
197. See Bruce & Sickler, Private Remedies Post-Midland, supra note 6, at 369–71.
198. See id. at 366.
199. See, e.g., Brief of ACA International as Amicus Curiae, Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct.
1407 (No. 16-348).
200. See Bruce & Sickler, Private Remedies Post-Midland, supra note 6, at 381.
201. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
202. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6, Spokeo,
Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1540 (No. 13-1339).
203. Civil No. 16–452 (MJD/TNL), 2017 WL 451945 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2017).
204. See Brief for Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellant at 7, Johnson, 2017 WL 451945 (No. 17-1298).
205. Id. at 5.
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REPSA, while interfacing with borrowers in bankruptcy. Accordingly,
the Bureau’s efforts to clarify core concepts relating to standing and
whether these statutes have been violated will affect the extent to which
these matters can be asserted in consumer bankruptcy cases.
Table 3: Scope of Bureau Authority
RULEMAKING
• Covered persons (those who provide consumer financial products or
services)
• Entities subject to particular enumerated consumer laws (Table 2)
SUPERVISION
• Banks with more than $10 billion in assets, including their affiliates
• Nonbank covered persons
• Larger market participants as defined by Bureau rules

ENFORCEMENT
• Banks with more than $10 billion in assets, including their affiliates (but
authority is concurrent with appropriate prudential regulator)
• Nonbank covered persons (but authority is concurrent with FTC and shared
pursuant to a memorandum of understanding)

III. THE BUREAU AS AN ADJUNCT REGULATOR
The prior Part explores how the Bureau’s regulatory activities have
crossed over into consumer bankruptcy cases. This Part argues that the
consumer bankruptcy process would benefit if the Bureau adopted a more
purposeful regulatory strategy in consumer bankruptcy cases. We explain
how structural realities and resource constraints undermine the consumer
bankruptcy system’s ability to regulate systematic misconduct internally,
and show that the Bureau can fill those gaps where its statutory authorities
interface with bankruptcy.
A. Consumer Bankruptcy Has Space for an Adjunct Regulator
1. Consumer Bankruptcy’s Enforcement Gap
The consumer bankruptcy process is a procedurally rigorous
undertaking. The Bankruptcy Code and Rules specify in painstaking
detail how debtors must marshal their income and assets, and how their
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/1
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debts must be reconciled before debtors receive a fresh start. Both during
the bankruptcy case and after discharge, the Bankruptcy Code limits the
type of collection activity that creditors may pursue.206 Creditors must
file a proof of claim in order to obtain their pro-rata share of a debtor’s
assets and plan payments,207 and must comply with detailed lift-stay
procedures if they wish to enforce their rights against the debtor’s
property.208
But creditors can economize by ignoring the details required by the
Code and procedural rules, or by failing to invest in technology that can
accommodate the particular requirements of an ongoing bankruptcy
case.209 Some creditors have also affirmatively overdrawn from the
bankruptcy process by seeking payment of debts in a manner that does
not align with bankruptcy’s distributional rules.210
This type of behavior has flourished in bankruptcy’s proof-of-claim
process. In 2008, Katherine Porter published the results of an empirical
study of bankruptcy mortgage claims, revealing endemic non-compliance
with the procedural rules governing claims.211 A majority of the claims
in Porter’s sample failed to comply with the documentation and detail
required by the Bankruptcy Code.212 Moreover, most claims overstated
the amount owed, in relation to the amount the debtor believed was
owed.213 This article led to new bankruptcy rules that require an
additional level of detail in bankruptcy claims,214 but case law following
206. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012) (providing that the filing of a bankruptcy petition
operates as a stay of a vast array of collection activities); id. § 524(a) (providing that the entry of
an order of discharge enjoins creditors from collecting discharged debt).
207. See generally id. § 501 (providing that creditors and interest holders may file proofs of
claim); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001–05 (setting forth the procedure for claims filing).
208. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(a).
209. See Bruce, Debtor Class, supra note 6, at 26–30.
210. See id. at 28–30.
211. Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX.
L. REV. 121, 123 (2008).
212. Id. at 162–63.
213. Id. Porter’s study reflects that creditors and debtors agreed on the amount the debtor
owed in only 4.4% of cases. Id. at 162. Of the 95.6% of cases where the debtor and creditor
disagreed on the amount of the debt, 70.4% of the time the mortgage lender asserted that more
was owed. Id. The median difference was $1366 and the average difference was $3533. Id. at 163.
214. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001, 3002.1. Bankruptcy Rule 3001 requires creditors to itemize
the interest, fees, expenses, and other charges claimed. Id. at 3001(c)(2). Secured creditors must
also state the amount necessary to cure a default and, if the lien is on the debtor’s principal
residence, provide an escrow statement as of the petition date. Id. If a creditor fails to supply the
information required by Rule 3001, the court may prohibit the lender from relying on such
information in future proceedings. Id. at 3001(c)(2)(D). The court may “award other appropriate
relief, including . . . attorney’s fees.” See id. at 3002.1, which requires holders of mortgage claims
to provide notice before a change in the amount of mortgage payments, as well as notices of the
fees, expenses or charges incurred postpetition that the claimant asserts are recoverable from the
debtor.
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those amendments suggest that some creditors have made the calculated
decision not to follow these rules.215
As described above, debt buyers have also flooded the bankruptcy
system with proofs of claim for debt on which the statute of limitations
have run.216 The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that is
typically raised in a claim objection.217 The creditors’ practice relies on
the likelihood that neither the debtor nor the chapter 7 or 13 trustee will
object to all filed claims, either because of the sheer number of claims
filed or because the cost of objecting outweighs the benefit to the
estate.218 As such, these creditors successfully overdraw small amounts
in individual bankruptcy cases, which in the aggregate may amount to
significant gains.219
Post-discharge debt collection is another fertile area for creditor
overreaching. Creditors have long undermined bankruptcy’s fresh start
through a variety of actions that violate bankruptcy’s discharge
injunction.220 For example, before the discharge injunction was codified,
creditors took advantage of the fact that the discharge was an affirmative
defense that had to be raised by the debtor in litigation.221 These creditors
relied on the likelihood that debtors would not understand this procedural
reality in order to obtain default judgments for debt that had been
discharged in bankruptcy.222 Then, in the 1990s, a large number of
215. See, e.g., In re Gravel, 556 B.R. 561, 580 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2016) (sanctioning creditor
$300,000 for its repeated failure to comply with Bankruptcy Rule 3002.1), vacated, PHH Mortg.
Corp. v. Sensenich, No. 5:16-cv-00257-gwc, 2017 WL 6999820 (D. Vt. Dec. 18, 2017).
216. See generally Bruce, Debt Buyers Beware, supra note 6, at 1 (describing this rash of
cases); Bruce & Sickler, Private Remedies Post-Midland, supra note 6, at 369–70 (providing
further detail of such occurrence); see also Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407,
1409–10 (2017) (holding that this practice does not violate the FDCPA).
217. See Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1412, 1414–15 (emphasizing this procedural point).
218. See Bruce & Sickler, Private Remedies Post-Midland, supra note 6, at 369–71
(describing this issue).
219. Id.
220. Section 524(a) of the Code provides that the discharge “operates as an injunction against
the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect,
recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of
such debt is waived.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2012).
221. Ralph Brubaker, Of State Sovereign Immunity and Prospective Remedies: The
Bankruptcy Discharge as Statutory Ex Parte Young Relief, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 461, 523 (2002)
(“[C]reditors could wantonly ignore the debtor’s discharge and sue in state court, in the hopes that
the debtor would simply default, and many debtors did default on the mistaken assumption that
the bankruptcy discharge made it unnecessary to appear and defend suits on discharged debts.”).
The discharge injunction was first codified as part of the “discharge amendments” to the 1898
Bankruptcy Act, which were enacted in 1970. See Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467, 84
Stat. 990. This treatment carried over into section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code, which was enacted
in 1978. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95–598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532).
222. See Brubaker, supra note 221, at 523.
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creditors embraced the practice of pursuing debt after discharge based on
reaffirmation agreements that were not filed with the court and were
therefore unenforceable.223 More recently, creditors have allegedly
refused to remove discharged debt from borrowers’ credit reports, in an
apparent effort to cajole future payment.224 And, student loan creditors
have allegedly generated large numbers of dischargeable student loans,
which they aggressively collect after bankruptcy despite the fact that
these loans were discharged.225 Debtors are particularly vulnerable to
these types of improper post-discharge debt-collection activities, because
they typically lack regular access to bankruptcy counsel after their case
has concluded.226
Creditors frequently run afoul of chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code
when their payment processing software is not robust enough to
accommodate the requirements of a chapter 13 bankruptcy case. 227 The
Bureau’s recent action against Ocwen Loan Servicing, a large nonbank
mortgage servicer, illustrates this problem.228 According to the Bureau’s
complaint, Ocwen uses one platform to calculate proof of claim amounts
and another to track prepetition arrearages, but those two systems do not
interact properly.229 Further, the Bureau alleges that Ocwen improperly
applied funds from chapter 13 trustees to miscellaneous suspense or other
nonpayment accounts, rather than to pay down the debt as required by the
terms of debtors’ plan.230 Ocwen also allegedly failed to conduct annual
223. See Bruce, Debtor Class, supra note 6, at 28–30 (describing the reaffirmation scandal).
224. See, e.g., Credit One Fin. v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 553 B.R. 221, 225 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) (raising this issue); Silver-Greenberg, Debts Canceled by Bankruptcy, supra note 150.
225. See generally Jason Iuliano, Student Loan Bankruptcy and the Meaning of Educational
Benefit, 93 AM. BANKR. L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (draft on file with author) (discussing this issue
in detail); Kara Bruce, Educational Discharge, supra note 6, at 3–7 (profiling recent cases).
226. See Bruce, Enforcement Gap, supra note 6, at 504.
227. See, e.g., Ronemus v. FTB Mortg. Servs. (In re Ronemus), 201 B.R. 458, 459–61
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996) (awarding damages to the debtor for, among other things, the creditor’s
failure to maintain adequate records, and misapplication of the debtor’s payments); In re Rathe,
114 B.R. 253, 257 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990) (“Payments made during the pendency of the Chapter
13 plan should have been applied by [the lender] to the current payments due and owing with the
arrearage amounts to be applied to the back payments. [The lender] cannot utilize its accounting
procedures to contravene the terms of a confirmed Chapter 13 plan and the Bankruptcy Code.”).
228. Complaint at 8, supra note 177, at 11–12.
229. Id. at 26. Paragraph 90 alleges that “[t]here is no connection between the proof of claim
as determined in Equator/REALResolution [the system Ocwen uses to process bankruptcy] and
the pre-petition arrearage balances in REALServicing. The proof of claim figures need to become
the REALServicing arrearage balances.” Id. (alteration in original).
230. Id. at 26–27. Paragraph 90 alleges that
[t]he process of converting a bankruptcy trustee payment to a payment batch is
highly manual and, therefore, both inefficient and at risk of error. Ocwen receives
funds from bankruptcy trustees that, generally, need to be applied to borrower
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or timely escrow analyses for loans in bankruptcy in violation of RESPA,
the FDCPA, and the CFPA, and then tried to collect any resulting
shortages in chapter 13 cases in violation of bankruptcy orders and
rules.231 Chapter 13 debtors are particularly sensitive to this kind of harm.
An escrow shortage increases their monthly payment, and where the plan
commits disposable income to unsecured creditors, the debtor may lack
money to make the higher monthly payment.232
2. Bankruptcy’s Vulnerability to Systemic Misconduct
The structure of the bankruptcy system makes it vulnerable to this
type of activity. Bankruptcy functions on economies of scale. In order to
maintain a low cost of access to bankruptcy, most professionals involved
in bankruptcy cases handle very heavy caseloads as a matter of routine.233
accounts as either pre-petition payments, post-petition payments, or bankruptcy
interests. There are some cases where, due to loan status, funds from the trustee
are not applied as payment, but are applied to miscellaneous suspense or other
non-payment accounts. Ocwen receives funds from bankruptcy trustees in a
single check that usually covers multiple accounts. Ocwen needs to apply the
funds across the different loans.
Id.

231. Id. at 32–33. Paragraphs 109 and 110 allege:
109. In some instances, Ocwen failed to perform or timely perform escrow
analyses during the pendency of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Further, Ocwen failed
to service its loans in accordance with bankruptcy protections and has attempted
to collect purported escrow shortages or arrears in violation of bankruptcy orders
and rules.
110. In June 2016, Ocwen’s Head of Bankruptcy testified that more than 22,000
borrowers in bankruptcy were impacted by Ocwen’s failure to conduct a timely
escrow analysis and that Ocwen is currently attempting to remediate these
borrowers. Ocwen’s consumer complaint data indicates that, for the year of April
2015 to April 2016, at least 8,000 of these 22,000 impacted borrowers
complained to Ocwen.

Id.

232. Id. at 36, ¶ 122. The Bureau’s complaint also asserts that Ocwen has transferred loans
to new servicers without providing understandable information about loans that are subject to a
bankruptcy discharge, information necessary to comply with consumer bankruptcy laws. Id. at 64
¶ 206.
233. See, e.g., HENRY J. SOMMER ET AL., CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 81
(John Rao ed., 11th ed. 2016) (“Once it has been decided that bankruptcy is appropriate in a
particular case, most of the remaining work is relatively routine. A good deal of it involves
preparation of the necessary papers for the initial filing.”); Rafael I. Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy
Rights Seriously, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1115, 1122 (2016) (“Although bankruptcy is formally a
judicial process, much of that process historically has been and continues to be managerial and
ministerial in nature.”); William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer
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Further, deep asymmetries in information, sophistication, and resources
between debtors and creditors make it easy for creditors to extract undue
benefits from the bankruptcy process.234 On one hand, debtors typically
lack deep institutional knowledge of the bankruptcy system.235 Even
though many debtors access bankruptcy with the assistance of
knowledgeable counsel, their attorneys frequently charge a low, flat fee
for bankruptcy representation that carves out collateral litigation.236 As
such, under-resourced debtors may have to pay out-of-pocket to
challenge wrongful behavior.237 Moreover, improper post-discharge
collection activity occurs when debtors no longer have regular exposure
to their attorneys or the protection of a pending bankruptcy case.
On the other hand, large institutional creditors regularly interface with
the bankruptcy system.238 Not only do they generally have a better
understanding of the details of the bankruptcy process, they also have an
incentive to perpetuate the conditions that allow them to profit across
many cases.239 Accordingly, creditors may be willing to spend significant
amounts to litigate or settle an individual debtor’s legal challenge, when
the outcome of that individual case has spillover effects for similar
bankruptcy cases.240 Meanwhile, an individual debtor cannot or will not
match those expenses and may well be incentivized to accept a settlement
the creditor offers.241
3. Bankruptcy’s Enforcers and Their Limitations
By all accounts, bankruptcy features a fairly robust system of
enforcers to address these problems. First, every consumer’s bankruptcy
case is assigned to a bankruptcy judge with broad authority to enforce
Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 397, 406 (1994) (“Routine, uncontested cases allow [consumer bankruptcy attorneys]
to charge low fees, which in turn makes it easier to attract a sufficiently large clientele to justify
investment in routinized procedures.”). But see Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee
Study: Final Report, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 121–22 (2012) (noting that, especially after
enactment of the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA),
“there are ever fewer seemingly simple cases”).
234. See generally, e.g., Iuliano, supra note 225 (discussing this dynamic in the context of
student loan collection).
235. See Bruce, Enforcement Gap, supra note 6, at 503–04.
236. See id. at 504; Lupica, supra note 233, at 110.
237. See Bruce, Enforcement Gap, supra note 6, at 502–04.
238. See Bruce, Debtor Class, supra note 6, at 37.
239. See Bruce, Enforcement Gap, supra note 6, at 503.
240. See id. (“Even if a consumer can surmount those hurdles, the amount she is able to
invest in a suit might well be dwarfed by the investment of a company that profits from
perpetuating the harm on similarly situated consumers.”).
241. See generally, e.g., Iuliano, supra note 225 (discussing how this phenomenon plays out
in student loan non-dischargeability litigation).
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bankruptcy law.242 Second, a trustee is appointed in every case to oversee
the liquidation process in a chapter 7 case, or to administer plan payments
in a chapter 13 bankruptcy case.243 Trustees are charged with the statutory
duty to maximize the estate for the benefit of all creditors, and that duty
would seem to include addressing systematic overdrawing by certain
creditors.244 Third, other creditors and debtors themselves may have the
power to challenge misconduct by other participants in a bankruptcy
case.245 And finally, the United States Trustee Program (USTP), a
division of the Department of Justice, serves as a “watchdog” against
systematic bankruptcy misconduct and can appear and be heard on any
matter.246 The following paragraphs detail how structural weaknesses
prevent these stakeholders from addressing widespread and small-scale
wrongdoing.
a. Bankruptcy’s Front-Line Participants
Although debtors, competing creditors, and the chapter 7 or 13 trustee
are involved in the trenches of a bankruptcy case and therefore are well
positioned to object to improper activity, practical realities and resource
constraints undermine their ability to do so comprehensively. First, the
242. In addition to any authority within an individual Code section, section 105(a) of the
Code gives bankruptcy judge broad authority to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code].” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)
(2012).
243. See 2 GINSBERG & MARTIN ON BANKRUPTCY § 15.03 [B], [C] (5th ed. Supp. III 2019).
In chapter 7 cases, the trustee typically oversees the liquidation of any non-exempt assets and
distribution of proceeds to creditors. See id. In chapter 13 cases, trustees collect debtors’ payments
under a plan and distribute them to creditors. See id.
244. See 11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (providing that the trustee is the representative for the estate);
Bruce & Sickler, Private Remedies Post-Midland, supra note 6, at 376 (discussing trustees’
duties).
245. See Bruce & Sickler, Private Remedies Post-Midland, supra note 6, at 375 (“Trustees
have sound arguments that other bankruptcy participants, including debtors . . . and the creditor
filing the proof of claim, have superior information to assess a claim’s staleness.”).
246. The U.S. Trustee Program is primarily a litigating division of the Department of Justice
(DOJ). Trustees and Administrators, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/
bankruptcy/trustees-and-administrators [https://perma.cc/SFL2-CHAL]. Its mission is to promote
the integrity and efficiency of the nation’s bankruptcy system for the benefit of all stakeholders—
debtors, creditors, and the public. Mark I. Bane et al., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 6.01[2]
(Matthew Bender ed., 16th ed. 2017) (describing the role of the UST). In addition to its
administrative oversight of the bankruptcy process, the U.S. Trustee has both civil and criminal
enforcement powers. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3) (2012) (delineating the administrative duties of
the UST); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 109 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6070
(“[The U.S. Trustees] will serve as enforcers of the bankruptcy laws by bringing proceedings in
the bankruptcy courts in particular cases in which a particular action taken or proposed to be taken
deviates from the standards established by the proposed bankruptcy code.”). In North Carolina
and Alabama, Bankruptcy Administrators, a division of the courts, fill a similar function. Trustees
and Administrators, supra.
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recoveries on such actions are often too small to justify the cost of
challenging the wrongful behavior.247 For example, proofs of claim that
fail to include adequate documentation or seek to collect improper
amounts may have negligible impact on a debtor’s distributions or case
outcome, but in the aggregate can result in cost savings or direct profits
to creditors that employ these strategies.248 Competing creditors likewise
lack a financial interest in objecting, as they often receive pennies or less
in distribution from an individual debtor’s bankruptcy case.249 Chapter 7
panel trustees receive payment of $60 in each bankruptcy case, “plus a
sliding-scale commission of the amounts they disburse from the
bankruptcy estate.”250 Most chapter 13 trustees receive a percentage of
the monthly disbursements made under a chapter 13 plan.251 Debtors’
attorneys, as noted above, generally receive a low, flat fee for bankruptcy
representation.252 These low fees make it difficult for bankruptcy
professionals to dedicate the time and attention it takes to address smallscale behavior in an individual case.253
In other writings, we have explored how these types of asymmetries
present a classic case for class action relief.254 Yet judicial limitations on
class actions in general, and complicated jurisdictional and remedial
issues facing debtor class actions in particular, may constrain their utility
in many debtors’ bankruptcy cases.255 More broadly, limitations inherent
in judicial doctrines can frustrate individual litigants’ efforts to police
bankruptcy misconduct.256
b. Bankruptcy Judges
Bankruptcy judges have some ability to police creditor misconduct
through their statutory and inherent powers to sanction.257 But,
247. See Bruce & Sickler, Private Remedies Post-Midland, supra note 6, at 376.
248. For a more robust discussion of this issue, see id.
249. See id.
250. Bruce, Debtor Class, supra note 6, at 38.
251. Bruce, Enforcement Gap, supra note 6, at 492.
252. Lupica, supra note 233, at 99.
253. See Matthew A. Bruckner, Crowdsourcing (Bankruptcy) Fee Control, 46 SETON HALL
L. REV. 361, 362 (2016) (arguing that bankruptcy professionals may lack the incentive to police
overdrawing).
254. See Bruce, Enforcement Gap, supra note 6, at 494–95; Bruce, Debtor Class, supra note
6, at 21; Bruce, Vindicating, supra note 6, at 445–46.
255. See Bruce, Enforcement Gap, supra note 6, at 512–14; Bruce, Debtor Class, supra note
6, at 43–44; Bruce, Vindicating, supra note 6, at 451–85.
256. See Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1804 (2019) (holding that a court may award
civil contempt sanctions for discharge violations where there is not a ‘fair ground of doubt’ as to
whether the creditor’s conduct might be lawful under the discharge order,” a standard that makes
it difficult for debtors and their attorneys to challenge novel types of potential discharge
violations).
257. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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bankruptcy courts lack investigatory powers, and therefore “do[] not have
the machinery to go beyond what is affirmatively presented, other than
what the court can learn from questioning the presenter directly.”258
Bankruptcy judges are further limited by the Bankruptcy Code’s remedial
scheme—which generally does not contemplate systemic misbehavior—
as well as the limitations of judges’ status under Article I of the
Constitution.259
Casamatta v. Resurgent Capital Services, L.P. (In re FreemanClay)260 provides a prime example of these limitations. There, the U.S.
Trustee brought suit against a claim servicer, alleging that the servicer
abused the bankruptcy process by (among other things) robosigning
proofs of claim, knowingly filing claims for time-barred debt, and failing
to attach the documentation required by Rule 3001(c).261 Although the
court found the defendants’ behavior to be “disturbing”262 and a violation
of several Bankruptcy Rules, the court nevertheless held that most of the
relief requested by the U.S. Trustee was beyond the court’s authority to
award.263 The court underscored that the Bankruptcy Code provided a
remedy for each of the actions the U.S. Trustee alleged: failure to comply
with the rules governing proofs of claim strips a claim of its prima facie
validity;264 expiration of the statute of limitations is an affirmative
defense to the allowability of a claim;265 and failure to comply with the
requirements in Rule 3001(c) provides additional enumerated remedies,

258. Richard B. Levin, Towards a Model of Bankruptcy Administration, 44 S.C. L. REV. 963,
982 (1993).
259. Bankruptcy Judges are Article I judges, and as such they lack the Article III protections
of life tenure and salary protection. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. On this basis, they are
generally understood to have fewer fundamentally “judicial” powers than their Article III
counterparts. See, e.g., Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1946 (2015); Exec.
Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25, 28 (2014); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 469
(2011); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).
260. 578 B.R. 423 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2017).
261. Id. at 427.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 455–57. In particular, the court held that the complaint’s allegation for
robosigning did not support a sanction award because the trustee did not allege that Resurgent
acted in bad faith, and there was no damage alleged to the debtors. Id. at 455–56. The court held
that Rule 9011 was not invoked for filing time-barred debt claims because that behavior did not
clearly violate the law. Id. at 456. And even though Resurgent did not dispute its failure to comply
with Rule 3001, the appropriate remedy for such violations is that the creditor’s proof of claim
loses its prima facie validity. Id. at 456–57. Although Rule 3001 permits courts to award “other
appropriate relief” in certain circumstances, “[c]ourts have rejected attempts to use the Rule to
impose miscellaneous creative remedies such as some of those urged by the UST.” Id. at 457.
264. Id. at 435 (collecting authority).
265. Id. at 438; see Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1412 (2017).
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including the award of reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees.266
Although the U.S. Trustee alleged that those remedies were insufficient
to address the conduct in the case before the court, the court rejected the
idea that it could impose additional penalties because of the creditor’s
systemic violations.267 It stated:
A review of the allegations of the Complaint makes clear
that the UST is not focused solely or even primarily on the
claims asserted by Defendants and filed by Resurgent in the
two bankruptcy cases before this Court. The Complaint is
replete with allegations of deficiencies in Resurgent’s
process with regard to the thousands of proofs of claims that
it has filed in jurisdictions all over the country. . . .
....
The Court concludes it has no power to grant relief which
would purport to be binding as to claims filed and conduct
occurring in cases other than the ones before this Court. But
if this Court had the power to do so, the Court would decline
to exercise it . . . . There are numerous legal and practical
reasons supporting this view.268
To be sure, bankruptcy courts possess some degree of authority to
sanction improper behavior or prevent an abuse of process.269 But courts
266. In re Freeman-Clay, 578 B.R. at 445. Rule 3001(c)(2)(D) provides that if the holder of
a claim fails to provide any information required by this subdivision (c), “the court may . . . (i)
preclude the holder from presenting the omitted information . . . or (ii) award other appropriate
relief, including reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees caused by the failure.” FED. R. BANKR.
P. 3001(c)(2)(D).
267. In re Freeman-Clay, 578 B.R. at 452–53.
268. Id.
269. Most courts have concluded that bankruptcy judges can exercise civil contempt
authority, either because they have inherent authority or because such power is vested in
bankruptcy courts by section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S.
Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019) (“[T]he statutes specifying that a discharge order ‘operates as an
injunction,’ and that a court may issue any ‘order’ or ‘judgment’ that is ‘necessary or appropriate’
to ‘carry out’ other bankruptcy provisions bring with them the ‘old soil’ that has long governed
how courts enforce injunctions.” (citations omitted)); Placid Ref. Co. v. Terrebonne Fuel & Lube,
Inc. (In re Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc.), 108 F.3d 609, 613 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[A] bankruptcy
court’s power to conduct civil contempt proceedings and issue orders in accordance with the
outcome of those proceedings lies in 11 U.S.C. § 105.”); Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove
Eng’g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1553 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[C]ourts have inherent contempt powers in
all proceedings, including bankruptcy, to ‘achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of
cases.’ Under § 105, Congress expressly grants court’s independent statutory powers in
bankruptcy proceedings to ‘carry out the provisions of’ the Bankruptcy Code through ‘any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate.’” (citations omitted) (first quoting
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991); then quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012)));
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are sharply divided over whether bankruptcy judges have criminal
contempt authority.270 “The principal constitutional concern . . . arises
from the fact that bankruptcy judges do not have the life tenure during
good behavior and protection against diminished compensation which
Article III, section 1, requires for federal judges exercising ‘[t]he judicial
Power of the United States.’”271 As such, most courts hold that
bankruptcy courts are limited to awarding compensatory or coercive
relief, or perhaps de minimis penalties.272 Remedies that purport to
address harms beyond the case before the court have been characterized
as matters of criminal contempt, beyond the court’s authority to
sanction.273 For this reason, many bankruptcy judges’ creative attempts
to address widespread bankruptcy misconduct have been reversed on
appeal.274
c. The United States Trustee Program
The USTP is bankruptcy’s primary structural safeguard, charged with
promoting the efficiency and integrity of the bankruptcy system.275 To
carry out its mission, the USTP performs many administrative,
regulatory, and enforcement functions, including monitoring creditor
Rainbow Magazine, Inc. v. Unified Capital Corp. (In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc.), 77 F.3d 278,
284 (9th Cir. 1996) (“There can be little doubt that bankruptcy courts have the inherent power to
sanction vexatious conduct presented before the court. The inherent power is recognized in the
statutory grant Congress has provided the bankruptcy courts . . . .”); Power Recovery Sys., Inc. v.
Dodge Chem. Co. (In re Power Recovery Sys., Inc.), 950 F.2d 798, 802 (1st Cir. 1991) (“It is
well-settled law that bankruptcy courts are vested with [civil] contempt power.”); Burd v. Walters
(In re Walters), 868 F.2d 665, 669 (4th Cir. 1989) (upholding bankruptcy court’s contempt award
based on Code section 105).
270. See Dyer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1193 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003) (collecting
cases).
271. Hipp, Inc. v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 895 F.2d 1503, 1510 (5th Cir. 1990).
272. See John A. E. Pottow & Jason S. Levin, Rethinking Criminal Contempt in the
Bankruptcy Courts, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 313–15 (2017) (cataloguing various courts’
approaches to this issue).
273. See generally Bruce, Channeling Under 362(k), supra note 6 (collecting examples).
274. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Stewart (In re Stewart), 647 F.3d 553, 556 (5th
Cir. 2011) (holding that the bankruptcy court exceeded its authority by requiring Wells Fargo to
audit every proof of claim filed in that jurisdiction, based on a pattern of misconduct relating to
claims); PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Sensenich, No. 5:16-cv-00257-gwc, 2017 WL 6999820, at *9 (D.
Vt. Dec. 18, 2017) (reversing award of punitive damages for rampant violations of Rule 3002.1
and bankruptcy court orders); Countrywide Homes Loans, Inc. v. McDermott, 426 B.R. 267, 281
(N.D. Ohio 2010) (stating that the lower court order requiring Countrywide to accompany each
proof of claim with a supplemental worksheet was not supported by the factual record in the
individual case before the court).
275. See Strategic Plan & Mission, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ust/strategicplan-mission [https://perma.cc/6T4Y-Z4HH] (last updated May 8, 2015) (“The mission of the
United States Trustee Program is to promote the integrity and efficiency of the bankruptcy system
for the benefit of all stakeholders – debtors, creditors, and the public.”).
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misconduct in the bankruptcy system.276 For over ten years, the USTP
has made curbing creditor misconduct in consumer bankruptcy cases a
key enforcement priority.277 The USTP exercises prosecutorial
discretion, focusing its enforcement efforts on cases “in which the
integrity of the bankruptcy system as a whole is at stake” and which
involve “substantial sums of money [or] particularly egregious
behavior.”278 Its achievements include numerous nationwide settlements
with a variety of large, institutional creditors to remedy systemic
violations of the Bankruptcy Code.279 In particular, the USTP has been
successful in holding mortgage servicers and unsecured creditors
accountable for violations of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules.280
276. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. TRS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES TRUSTEE
PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 2
(2016), https://www.justice.gov/ust/file/ar_2016.pdf/download [https://perma.cc/LA2M-3XMA].
The Program has broad administrative authority over all bankruptcy cases. See id. (describing the
Program’s core authority). Its core responsibilities include participating directly in chapter 11
cases; overseeing the work of thousands of private trustees appointed in chapter 7, 12, and 13
bankruptcy cases; supervising credit counseling and financial education agencies that operate in
tandem with the bankruptcy process; pursuing criminal enforcement; and participating in appeals
on key bankruptcy issues. See id.
277. See Clifford J. White III, Dir., U.S. Tr. Program, Director Cliff White Addresses the
2017 Fall Conference of the National Creditors Bar Association (Oct. 12, 2017) [hereinafter
White, NCBA Address], https://www.justice.gov/ust/speeches-testimony/narca_10122017
[https://perma.cc/P3CL-W3GV]; see also Ongoing Oversight: Monitoring the Activities of the
Justice Department’s Civil, Tax and Environment and Natural Resources Divisions and the U.S.
Trustee Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and
Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 55 (2015) (statement of Clifford J.
White III, Director, Executive Office for U.S. Trustees, U.S. Department of Justice) (“In fiscal
year 2014, United States Trustees initiated more than 6,800 civil enforcement actions and
inquiries against creditors, lawyers, bankruptcy petition preparers, and other parties who acted
improperly towards debtors. Nearly 2,100 of these related to abusive conduct by creditors,
including about 72 percent of which involved mortgage fraud and abuse.”).
278. Tamara Ogier & Jack F. Williams, Bankruptcy Crimes and Bankruptcy Practice, 6 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 317, 347–48 (1998).
279. See A Time to Reform: Oversight of the Activities of the Justice Department’s Civil,
Tax, and Environmental and Natural Resources Divisions and the U.S. Trustee Program: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 3, 10–11 (2017) (statement of Clifford J. White III, Director, Executive
Office for U.S. Trustees, U.S. Department of Justice) (“[T]he USTP has entered into six national
settlements that provided monetary remediation and other relief for homeowners in bankruptcy
and, in some cases, required mortgage servicing standards to prevent future abuse of the
bankruptcy rules.”).
280. See, e.g., Order Approving Settlement Between the United States Trustee Program,
Citibank, N.A. and Department Stores National Bank at 4, In re Fazzon, No. 18-00201-jrs (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 2018) (requiring Citibank to pay $5 million to remediate robo-signed proofs
of claim in consumer bankruptcy cases); Order Approving Settlement Between the United States
Trustee Program and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. at 2, In re Belzak, No. 10-23963-dob (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Mar. 3, 2015); see also White, NCBA Address, supra note 277.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

41

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 2 [], Art. 1

200

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

But despite these achievements, the USTP faces structural barriers to
addressing widespread but small-scale consumer protection issues. Most
importantly, the USTP lacks the broad, market-wide information
gathering resources that the Bureau has and already deploys on a regular
basis.281 While the USTP has the ability to examine entities pursuant to
Rule 2004 of the Bankruptcy Code282 and to engage in ordinary discovery
in adversary proceedings and contested matters,283 these powers are
sharply confined to an individual debtor or case.
Further, the USTP’s civil enforcement authority is constrained by the
Code’s remedial limitations.284 Just as bankruptcy courts and private
litigants have faced barriers in addressing creditor misconduct that has
occurred on a widespread basis, the USTP is likewise limited to the
remedies provided by the Bankruptcy Code and whatever authority
Article I bankruptcy judges possess to fill in the gaps.285 The USTP’s
unsuccessful attempts to address the problem of stale debt claims within
the confines of individual bankruptcy cases, as in Freeman-Clay,
discussed above, underscores some of these points.286 To be sure, the
USTP may make criminal referrals in the appropriate cases, but this
power leaves a large amount of non-criminal but nevertheless improper
conduct without a meaningful aggregate solution.287
d. Law Reform and Procedural Rule Reform
Congress could amend the Bankruptcy Code to address the
bankruptcy-related non-compliance described in this Section. More
immediately, some of the problems discussed in this Section might be
tempered by amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,
or by court-crafted local rules or standing orders.288 Yet the law or rule281. See infra Section IV.A.
282. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(a) (“On motion of any party in interest, the court may order the
examination of any entity.”).
283. See id. at 7026 (incorporating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 with respect to
adversary proceedings); id. at 9014 (providing that Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7026
also applies to contested matters).
284. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Stewart (In re Stewart), 647 F.3d 553, 556 (5th
Cir. 2011); Casamatta v. Resurgent Capital Servs., L.P. (In re Freeman-Clay), 578 B.R. 423, 427–
28 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2017).
285. See supra Section III.A.5.
286. See supra Section III.A.3; supra note 246 and accompanying text.
287. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(F) (2012) (providing that the U.S. Trustee’s duties includes
“notifying the appropriate United States attorney of matters which relate to the occurrence of any
action which may constitute a crime under the laws of the United States and, on the request of the
United States attorney, assisting the United States attorney in carrying out prosecutions based on
such action”).
288. See generally, e.g., Bruce & Sickler, Private Remedies Post-Midland, supra note 6
(examining the possibility of law and rule reform to address the problem of time-barred-debt
claims).
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reform process is slow and reactionary, and typically targets issues only
after they have arisen in thousands of cases. Further, amendments that
impose greater regulatory checks on creditors are likely to be hotly
contested by the industry participants who profit from this type of
behavior. In contrast, capitalizing on the Bureau’s existing authority to
address bankruptcy-specific regulatory gaps requires nothing beyond
greater attention and communication between the Bureau and
bankruptcy’s stakeholders.
B. The Bureau’s Regulatory Authority Complements Bankruptcy’s
Enforcement Regime
The prior Section explained that bankruptcy’s existing regulators are
not well suited to address pervasive but small-scale misbehavior in
bankruptcy cases. This Section explains how the Bureau’s triad of
authority—rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement—complements
consumer bankruptcy’s regulatory structure. The following Part develops
this broad overview by providing a detailed regulatory blueprint for
enhanced Bureau regulation in consumer bankruptcy.
1. The Bureau’s Regulatory Promise
The Bureau can provide the most direct and unique benefits to the
consumer bankruptcy system through a more purposeful application of
its data-gathering powers. As noted in Part II, the Bureau has broad
authority to gather intelligence from regulated entities, and already may
be gathering bankruptcy-specific information in the ordinary course of its
operations.289 The Bureau also operates a consumer complaint database
and has the power to engage in market research and monitoring to identify
market-wide trends.290 Bankruptcy’s existing enforcers lack such
information-gathering powers, and structural realities in bankruptcy
make systematic misconduct difficult to detect.291 If the Bureau employed
its information-gathering tools to unearth bankruptcy-specific
misconduct, and shared its findings with bankruptcy’s existing enforcers,
this partnership could enhance the utility of bankruptcy’s case-by-case
remedial system.
The Bureau also has the power to issue administrative rules, which
apply globally to the institutions and products it regulates.292 This
289. See supra Section II.B.1.
290. See infra Part IV.
291. See Bruce, Enforcement Gap, supra note 6, at 502–03; J. Maria Glover, The Structural
Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1181–
82 (2012) (arguing that public regulators, including the Bureau, have “significant informational
advantages” because of the complexity of financial protection abuse and the fact that it is often
difficult to detect except by reference to a large number of cases).
292. See supra Section II.A.
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rulemaking authority stands in sharp contrast to the fragmented, case-bycase policymaking that typifies the consumer bankruptcy process.293
Consumer bankruptcy lacks an administrative agency charged with
rulemaking authority.294 Rather, courts make bankruptcy policy on a
case-by-case basis.295 But policymaking through case-by-case
adjudication cannot achieve comprehensive, system-wide regulation.296
Courts are restricted to resolving the disputes presented to them. These
disputes are not determined by the most pressing legal issues, but rather
by the resources and interests of individual plaintiffs or complainants.297
Further, even if creditor misconduct is challenged in court, adjudications
of individual disputes lack precedential value and are often subject to
review by courts that are not experts in the bankruptcy field.298 All of this
can contribute to the ragged development of policy across jurisdictions.299
Although the Bureau does not have authority to promulgate rules to
implement the Bankruptcy Code, its regulations on loan servicing, credit
reporting, and debt collection often cross over into the bankruptcy
system. As such, the Bureau may be able to target improper behavior
occurring in bankruptcy through these general consumer protection
regulations.
Finally, the Bureau’s authority to enforce federal consumer protection
law is more flexible than the court-centric nature of bankruptcy
enforcement. While bankruptcy courts are limited to policing conduct
according to the Bankruptcy Code’s remedial scheme, the Bureau has
tools to work creatively and collaboratively with industry groups to find
realistic solutions to increase compliance with bankruptcy laws.300 The

293. See Rafael Pardo & Kathryn Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy
Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 390–91 (2012) (arguing for shifting bankruptcy
policymaking from court-administered model to an administrative agency model). Two federal
agencies exist with narrowly defined powers to set bankruptcy policy in limited contexts. See id.
at 390. The first is the U.S. Trustee Program, which is a component of the U.S. Department of
Justice and is responsible for all but two jurisdictions, North Carolina and Alabama, where the
second, the Bankruptcy Administrators Program, operates under the Judicial Conference of the
United States. Id. at 394–95. They can participate in bankruptcy cases as litigants who enforce
bankruptcy laws. Id. at 398. They also have authority to supervise private trustees, credit
counseling and educational agencies, and other professionals working in the bankruptcy space.
Id. at 398–99. But neither has expansive rulemaking power to set substantive policy. Id. at 399.
294. Id. at 399.
295. Id. at 440.
296. Id.
297. See supra Section III.A.2.
298. Pardo & Watts, supra note 293, at 425.
299. See id. at 386–91.
300. See Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 369, 375–76 (2019) (contrasting rulemaking and enforcement with examination
because monitors work with industry and not against it).
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Bureau could strategically deploy its enforcement authority to target
conduct that eludes bankruptcy’s remedial system.
Case law has shown that creditor action or inaction related to
bankruptcy can violate various consumer protection laws under the
Bureau’s enforcement authority, including TILA, RESPA, the FDCPA,
and the UDAAP ban.301 The Bureau’s authority to enforce these laws
might provide additional remedial solutions for the type of conduct that
the bankruptcy system has difficulty addressing. In these ways, the
Bureau’s enforcement powers can act as an additional check on industry
groups and serve as a deterrent for other market actors.
2. Complementary Regulatory Regimes
Embracing the Bureau’s role as an adjunct regulator neither exceeds
the Bureau’s statutory authority nor undermines the integrity of federal
bankruptcy laws. Although the Bureau does not have express authority to
promulgate regulations under the authority of the Bankruptcy Code, its
authority was designed to be sweeping, so that consumer financial
protection laws would be “comprehensive, fair, and vigorously
enforced.”302 As drafted, the Bureau’s authority covers the major players
within the financial services markets, and governs virtually every
dimension of the financial products and services those players
generate.303 Considering that bankruptcy looms as a possible end game
in many of the financial transactions under Bureau authority, it fits easily
within the umbrella of the Bureau’s operations.
More to the point, the Bureau has shown a particular interest in
addressing problems relating to the servicing and collection of debt.304
“[A]t its core, [bankruptcy] is debt-collection law.”305 And as detailed
above, the very same providers that are subject to Bureau regulation
outside of bankruptcy become creditors with claims in a consumer’s
bankruptcy case.306 Moreover, the history of the Dodd-Frank Act makes
clear that many of the Act’s protections were meant to operate in tandem
with the Bankruptcy Rules.307 If regulators carved out bankruptcy-related
301. See, e.g., Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 730–33 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that
the FDCPA can apply to address misconduct in bankruptcy); Haynes v. Chase Bank USA, N.A.
(In re Haynes), No. 11-23212, 2014 WL 3608891, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014) (holding
that FCRA applied to bankruptcy-related misconduct).
302. H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 730 (2010) (Conf. Rep.).
303. See supra Part II.
304. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting that debt collection has been
identified as a “high risk” area for examination purposes).
305. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 3 (1986).
306. See supra Section II.A.2.
307. See Frederick Tung et al., Consumer Bankruptcy Panel: Recent Developments in
Bankruptcy Regulation: Mortgage Servicing Rules, the FDCPA, and the CFPB, 32 EMORY
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creditor conduct from the Bureau’s regulatory activities, the result would
be to provide debtors in bankruptcy, a particularly vulnerable class of
consumers, fewer protections than their non-bankrupt counterparts.308
As described in more detail in Part II, above, the Bureau can regulate
many bankruptcy-related activities without conflicting with the
Bankruptcy Code.309 The Supreme Court has underscored that federal
statutes with overlapping application should be harmonized wherever
possible.310 “When two federal statutes address the same subject in
different ways, the right question is whether one implicitly repeals the
other—and repeal by implication is a rare bird indeed.”311 One statute
impliedly repeals the other only “where provisions in two statutes are in
‘irreconcilable conflict,’ or where the latter Act covers the whole subject
of the earlier one and ‘is clearly intended as a substitute.’”312
Applying this principle, most courts have held that federal consumer
protection laws, including the FDCPA, RESPA, FCRA, and TILA, can
potentially remediate bankruptcy-related harms.313 Indeed, the Supreme
Court recently had the opportunity to foreclose the application of the
FDCPA in consumer bankruptcy cases, and declined to do so.314
The Supreme Court has likewise underscored that Congress might
purposefully layer complementary enforcement regimes as part of a
broader legislative scheme. In POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca Cola Co.,315
BANKR. DEV. J. 303, 322–24 (2016) (during a panel discussion, Sarah Mancini, Of Counsel for
the National Consumer Law Center and an attorney for Atlanta Legal Aid, noted that RESPA,
TILA, the Dodd-Frank Act’s amendments to those statutes, and the CFPB rules promulgated as a
result are meant to “walk[] hand in hand” with bankruptcy’s procedural rules).
308. See supra Part II.
309. The Bureau’s existing regulation of periodic mortgage statements provides a prime
example of how the Bureau’s rulemaking activities can harmonize with the Bankruptcy Code and
Rules, providing borrowers in bankruptcy with all of the protections available to their nonbankrupt counterparts. See supra notes 84–100 and accompanying text.
310. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 673 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143–
44 (2001); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
311. Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 2004).
312. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) (plurality opinion) (quoting Posadas v. Nat’l
City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)).
313. See, e.g., Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334, 1342 (11th Cir. 2016),
rev’d on other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017); Simon v. FIA Card Servs, N.A., 732 F.3d 259,
274 (3d Cir. 2013); Randolph, 368 F.3d at 730; see also Bruce, Debt Buyers Beware, supra note
6, at 5–6 (discussing these arguments). Several cases that come to a contrary conclusion analyze
the matter as one of federal preemption rather than implied repeal and are improperly decided.
See Bruce, Debt Buyers Beware, supra note 6, at 6–8 (discussing the weaknesses in the analysis
of Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 510 (9th Cir. 2002), among other cases).
314. See Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1415–16; see also Kara Bruce, The Supreme Court’s
2017 FDCPA Rundown, BANKR. L. LETTER (Thomson Reuters, St. Paul, Minn.), Sept. 2017, at 1,
6–7 (discussing matters left open by the Court’s narrow decision in Midland Funding).
315. 573 U.S. 102 (2014).
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the Court permitted competitors to bring private claims for unfair
competition under the Lanham Act, even though the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) regulated juice labeling as part of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetics Act.316 The Court reasoned that the Lanham Act and the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act had distinct, but complementary goals.
“Although both statutes touch on food and beverage labeling, the Lanham
Act protects commercial interests against unfair competition, while the
[Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act] protects public health and safety.”317
The Court further noted that the enforcement structures built into these
statutes also complement one another.318 Indeed, allowing the Lanham
Act to augment the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with a private right of
action “takes advantage of synergies among multiple methods of
regulation” and “is quite consistent with . . . congressional design.”319 As
noted earlier, consumer bankruptcy and consumer financial protection
have policy and practical synergies that lend themselves to this kind of
collaboration.
The Bureau’s examination and rulemaking authority does not
duplicate the work of any bankruptcy regulator. As noted, bankruptcy’s
overseer, the USTP, has limited information-gathering and policy-setting
authority.320 As such, the Bureau’s efforts to engage in these tasks might
bring welcome clarity and consistency to consumer bankruptcy
regulation.321
Further, a number of structural limits prevent the Bureau from
overreaching into consumer bankruptcy. First, the Administrative
Procedure Act permits notice-and-comment rulemaking and requires the
Bureau to consider comments that raise a potential conflict with federal
statutes.322 For example, when the Bureau issued regulations for
mortgage servicers in bankruptcy, the notice-and-comment period
permitted interested parties to raise concerns about interference with the
automatic stay, which the agency considered and addressed with
bankruptcy-specific modifications.323 Notice-and-comment rulemaking
does not eliminate conflict concerns, but it does afford interested parties
the opportunity to voice such concerns and compels the Bureau to
consider them.324 And, if the Bureau creates a rule that interest holders
316. Id. at 106.
317. Id. at 115.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 115–16.
320. See supra notes 292–299 and accompanying text.
321. See Rao, supra note 100, at 17 (discussing how the Bureau’s mortgage servicing rules
represent an effort to harmonize the Bankruptcy Code with overlapping consumer protection law).
322. See Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (prescribing rulemaking
process).
323. See supra Section II.A.2.
324. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (requiring notice and comment on proposed agency rules).
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believe poses a conflict, then the APA provides procedures for
challenging it.325
To be sure, enhanced Bureau activity in consumer bankruptcy runs the
risk of over-enforcement of consumer laws. But the model proposed
below is crafted to address gaps the consumer bankruptcy system cannot.
This model constrains the Bureau’s activities to adjunct regulation rather
than concurrent regulation, permitting it to use its authority to promote
equity and efficiency in consumer bankruptcy.
IV. A MODEL FOR ADJUNCT REGULATION
This Article has so far explored the scope of the Bureau’s current
activities in bankruptcy and made the case that the Bureau might deploy
its regulatory tools to address systematic bankruptcy misconduct. This
Part sketches a blueprint for how the Bureau could more purposefully
exercise its statutory authorities for the benefit of consumer bankruptcy.
Because the Bureau’s recent leadership and structural changes render
much of this proposal aspirational in the near term, this Part also suggests
how other enforcers—state regulators and private litigants—can fill
regulatory gaps.
A. An Aspirational Bankruptcy-Focused Regulatory Blueprint
A well-functioning regulatory system relies on strong informationgathering resources and consultation with experts and stakeholders to
achieve strategic regulatory priorities. As such, data and consultation
should form the foundation of the Bureau’s bankruptcy-focused
regulatory agenda. First, the Bureau should use its intelligence-gathering
toolkit to collect and analyze market-wide information about bankruptcyrelated misconduct. Second, the Bureau, in consultation with the USTP,
should use the information gathered to set bankruptcy-specific
examination priorities. If these phases uncover misconduct requiring
either entity-specific or market-wide regulatory responses, the Bureau
should pursue targeted enforcement and rulemaking agendas that address
them. Throughout this process, the Bureau should consult with
bankruptcy’s other stakeholders, including case trustees, debtors’
attorneys, consumers and industry groups, and the USTP, to refine the
focus of its activities and to avoid overreaching.326

325. See id. § 706 (articulating the scope of judicial review that applies to agency actions).
326. The Bureau can engage with case trustees through national organizations such as the
National Association of Chapter 13 Trustees and National Association of Trustees, consumer
debtor attorneys through the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, and
industry through a variety of national membership-based associations.
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1. Step One: Information Gathering
As described in Part II, the Bureau has a variety of informationcollecting tools at its disposal. These resources could yield critical data
to provide a foundation for setting more precise, bankruptcy-focused
regulatory priorities. The Bureau should use these tools, in robust
consultation with other regulatory actors, to identify patterns of
bankruptcy-related misconduct.
The Bureau’s consumer complaint database is a key source of
information that the Bureau can use to identify problematic conduct. The
Bureau uses this database for myriad purposes. Not only does it
“collect[], investigat[e], and respond[] to [individual] consumer
complaints,”327 it also uses the complaint data for regulatory purposes. It
analyzes the complaint data to inform supervision and examination,
rulemaking, and enforcement priorities.328 It also shares complaint data
with state and federal agencies.329
A recent search of the complaint database using the word
“bankruptcy” produced 20,117 complaints.330 That search subdivided the
results by 17 products or sub-products and roughly 120 issues or subissues, most of which relate to the bankruptcy process.331 These results
indicate that consumers are turning to the database for assistance with
debt that is or has been administered in bankruptcy. The Bureau could
study these complaints to identify patterns of potential misconduct,
paying particular attention to bankruptcy’s various trigger points—areas
in which a creditor’s risk of noncompliance may be high. We identify
several such areas in Part III, including the proof-of-claim process,
servicing of debt in chapter 13 cases, and post-discharge debt servicing
and reporting. Ongoing and periodic reviews of the data might reveal
patterns of bankruptcy-related misconduct by certain creditors or across
a particular market.
The Bureau could share its non-public complaint data and analysis
with the USTP through an interagency working group. Consultation with
government stakeholders is a hallmark of the Bureau’s operations. And,
considering the USTP’s authority to serve as bankruptcy’s “watchdog,”

327. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(c)(2) (2012). The Bureau’s Office of Consumer Response, a mandated
unit, centralizes, monitors, and responds to these complaints. Id. § 5493(b)(3)(A).
328. See id. § 5511(b).
329. See Angela Littwin, Why Process Complaints? Then and Now, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 895,
897 (2015).
330. Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.
consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/search/?from=0&has_narrative=true
&searchField=all&searchText=bankruptcy&size=25&sort=created_date_desc [https://perma.cc/
U77K-Z34C]. At the time of this search, the database contained 1,420,970 total entries. Id.
331. Id.
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it is an ideal partner for the Bureau.332 While the USTP could benefit
greatly from the Bureau’s broad information-gathering tools, it could also
contribute its bankruptcy expertise and the front-line intelligence
supplied by its field attorneys. This working-group model provides the
Bureau and the USTP with a forum for determining whether the patterns
detected in the data warrant regulatory action. It also ensures that the
strategic bankruptcy priorities set and the regulatory actions that ensue
are done collaboratively with bankruptcy’s primary overseer.
The Bureau could also publish a bankruptcy-specific “Complaint
Snapshot” to publicize issues affecting the bankruptcy process. The
Bureau periodically publishes Complaint Snapshots that “provide[] a
high-level overview of trends in consumer complaints” over a particular
period.333 These reports often isolate and analyze the complaints in a
particular market line, such as mortgage servicing or debt collection.334
Publishing a bankruptcy-focused Complaint Snapshot is a key example
of how the Bureau can support bankruptcy’s regulators without
overreaching. The Bureau’s data and analysis on bankruptcy-specific
complaints can crystalize issues that bankruptcy’s existing regulators
have difficulty discovering on a case-by-case basis. Then, bankruptcy’s
enforcers can leverage this information to enforce bankruptcy laws within
the confines of bankruptcy’s remedial scheme.
To be sure, the use of non-public complaint data to set regulatory
priorities might draw criticism, because the data presents one-sided
stories and may not be representative of all consumers’ bankruptcy
experiences.335 But even so, this database provides a valuable starting
point for the Bureau and USTP to detect patterns that may warrant
additional study.336 Other information-gathering tools, such as the
Bureau’s division of Research, Markets, and Regulation (RMR), might
provide a more comprehensive source of intelligence on market-wide
trends in consumer finance.337
332. See Leonard Kennedy et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial
Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1159–60 (2012) (noting that
the Bureau has hired and solicited input from other government leaders).
333. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, COMPLAINT SNAPSHOT: MORTGAGE 2–3
(2019).
334. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, COMPLAINT SNAPSHOT: DEBT COLLECTION
11–12 (2018); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 333, at 10.
335. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 334 (discussing these issues).
336. See Pamela Foohey, Calling on the CFPB for Help: Telling Stories and Consumer
Protection, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 182 (2017) (describing how the Bureau’s complaint
database includes “information and analysis about complaint numbers, complaint types,
and . . . information about resolution of complaints”).
337. See 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(1) (2012) (mandating a research, analysis, and reporting unit);
id. § 5512(c) (requiring the Bureau to monitor for risks to consumers in the offering or provision
of consumer financial products or services).
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The RMR division monitors consumer financial markets and conducts
market research.338 RMR is meant to provide the Bureau with a researchdriven, evidence-based perspective on consumer financial markets,
consumer behavior, and regulation.339 The Bureau gathers this
information by issuing notices of Requests for Information (RFI) in the
Federal Register, which in turn seek comment from a variety of
stakeholders, including consumers and industry, on market-wide
conduct.340 The Bureau uses RFIs to collect information from the public
to generate topical reports,341 set supervisory priorities,342 and frame
rulemaking efforts.343 The Bureau can also require regulated entities to
provide a variety of information to fulfill these functions.344
The Bureau could issue RFIs to gain information from bankruptcy’s
stakeholders about specific weaknesses in bankruptcy regulation. First,
the Bureau could consult with the USTP to identify topics and questions
appropriate for an RFI. Next, the RFIs could seek input from diverse
bankruptcy stakeholders including case trustees, consumers and
consumer debtor attorneys, and industry groups. The Bureau could share
analysis from these data with the USTP working group to inform internal
efforts to address bankruptcy misconduct. It could also apply these data
to set bankruptcy-specific priorities for supervision and examination.345

338. Research, Markets & Regulations, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.
consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/research-markets-regulation/ [https:
//perma.cc/SK4H-WM2S].
339. Id.
340. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5511(c); Request for Information Regarding the Small Business
Lending Market, 82 Fed. Reg. 22,318-01, 22,318 (May 15, 2017). Voluntary submissions in
response to a CFPB RFI are part of the public record and subject to public disclosure. Request for
Information Regarding Bureau Public Reporting Practices of Consumer Complaint Information,
83 Fed. Reg. 9,499, 9,499 (Mar. 6, 2018). Material that covered persons submit to the CFPB under
this compulsory process retains its privileges and confidentiality. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1785(j), 1828(x);
12 C.F.R. § 1070.48(a) (2019) (“The submission by any person of any information to the CFPB
for any purpose in the course of any supervisory or regulatory process of the CFPB shall not be
construed as waiving, destroying, or otherwise affecting any privilege such person may claim with
respect to such information under Federal or State law as to any person or entity other than the
CFPB.”).
341. See, e.g., KENNETH P. BREVOORT & MICHELLE KAMBARA, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, CFPB DATA POINT: BECOMING CREDIT VISIBLE 5 (2017); The Impact of Differences
Between Consumer- and Creditor-Purchased Credit Scores, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION
BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/the-impact-of-differencesbetween-consumer-and-creditor-purchased-credit-scores/ [https://perma.cc/H527-B8S2].
342. See 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(3)(D).
343. See id. § 5512.
344. See id. § 5512(c)(4)(b)(ii).
345. See Littwin, supra note 329, at 902–03 (explaining how the Bureau can use complaints
to inform supervision and examination priorities).
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2. Step Two: Setting and Executing on Supervision Priorities
The Bureau’s examination and supervision authority builds on this
foundation of information gathering. It provides targeted opportunities to
gather additional information from supervised entities, while also
encouraging compliance. The information gathered through this process
might also inform specific enforcement and rulemaking priorities or
directly support USTP enforcement activities.
As described in Part II, the Bureau’s Examination manual already
directs examiners to gather information on several key areas that
implicate bankruptcy, such as mortgage servicing, debt collection, and
credit reporting.346 The Bureau could consult with the USTP to develop
these areas with more precise questions or to add additional topics. By
embracing these aspects of examination and sharing the products of
examination with bankruptcy enforcers, the Bureau can leverage its
supervision authority to uncover more bankruptcy non-compliance than
is currently detected.
While supervision is a resource-intensive dimension of the Bureau’s
operations, this proposal does not meaningfully expand the Bureau’s
supervisory activities. Instead, this proposal simply puts a finer point on
the bankruptcy-specific supervision that the Bureau already pursues. This
increased bankruptcy-specific supervision has potential to compel
compliance both from the supervised entities and across the market as a
whole. For example, if the Bureau discovers that a creditor’s policies and
procedures are deficient, the Bureau can obtain corrective action or
initiate an enforcement action against that creditor. The Bureau can also
signal to other market actors—through its “Supervisory Highlights”—
conduct the Bureau wishes to prevent. This might prompt those parties to
adjust their compliance management systems to conform. In both cases,
the Bureau targets compliance problems at an institutional level, rather
than through an individual case.347
3. Step Three: Enforcement & Rulemaking
With the strong foundation of information drawn from consumer
complaints, market research, and examination, the Bureau could develop
enforcement and rulemaking priorities to fill bankruptcy’s remedial

346. See supra Section II.B.2.b.
347. While the confidentiality of the supervision process is a potential weakness because of
the possibility of agency capture, where it functions as intended, it has potential to reduce harm
in the bankruptcy system on a widespread basis. See Braucher & Littwin, supra note 111, at 88
(defining regulatory capture as where “a regulated industry has disproportionate influence over
its regulator”).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/1

52

Sickler and Bruce: Bankruptcy's Adjunct Regulator

2020]

BANKRUPTCY’S ADJUNCT REGULATOR

211

gaps.348 As explained above, bankruptcy’s remedial scheme is poorly
equipped to address widespread but small-value misbehavior.349 Acting
as an adjunct regulator, the Bureau could deploy its enforcement and
rulemaking authority over federal consumer financial law in ways that
are targeted to address such conduct.
The Bureau’s enforcement action against Ocwen, described above,
provides a framework for studying how the Bureau might use its
enforcement authority to improve compliance with bankruptcy law.350 In
that case, the Bureau detected harms to debtors in bankruptcy in its
ongoing supervision of Ocwen’s operations.351 The Bureau leveraged this
information to launch an enforcement action targeting Ocwen’s improper
conduct both inside and outside of bankruptcy.352 This enforcement
action resulted in a consent order that prohibited Ocwen from engaging
in specific violations of bankruptcy law.353
This type of enforcement has the potential to improve compliance of
both the target of the enforcement action and other market participants.
The penalties issued and consent agreements reached are calibrated to
deter the regulated entity from repeating such conduct in the future. But
the settlement terms of consent orders offer other regulated entities
guidance about the kinds of practices the Bureau deems improper and
might encourage them to adjust their practices to conform.
To maximize the regulatory potential of consent orders in bankruptcy,
the Bureau should include provisions, informed by the USTP, that
unambiguously address any bankruptcy dimensions of the defendant’s
conduct. The Ocwen consent order, for example, prohibited Ocwen from
engaging in specific bankruptcy conduct.354 In contrast, the Bureau’s
recent consent orders with large debt buyers, discussed in Part II above,
do not expressly state that they encompass consumer bankruptcy

348. See Patricia A. McCoy, Inside Job: The Assault on the Structure of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2543, 2563–64 (2019) (explaining the symbiosis
of rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement).
349. See supra Section III.A.2.
350. See supra Section II.C.2.
351. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. These efforts might also have been
informed by the consumer complaint database, which lists more than 23,000 complaints involving
“Ocwen” filed before 2017. See Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION
BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/search/?from=
0&searchField=all&searchText=&size=25&sort=created_date_desc [https://perma.cc/F35X-N7LL]
(filter results by typing “Ocwen” into search bar; narrow date CFPB received the complaint to
through “12/31/2016”).
352. See Complaint at 1, supra note 179, at 6–7.
353. See supra Section II.C.2.
354. See Consent Judgment, supra note 178.
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issues.355 Although these latter orders are written using sweeping
language that prohibits the collection of time-barred debt through “any
means,”356 creditors have previously argued that filing proofs of claim in
bankruptcy does not qualify as a form of debt collection.357 To be sure,
this argument has not gained much traction in the courts, and the consent
orders would thus likely be construed as covering bankruptcy-related
debt collection.358 But drafting consent orders with their bankruptcy
implications squarely in focus would eliminate the need for clarifying
litigation over similar matters in the future.
The Bureau might also fill bankruptcy’s regulatory gaps through
targeted rulemaking activities. The Bureau’s rulemaking is characterized
by evidenced-based decision making.359 These underpinnings ensure that
the Bureau does not tread into bankruptcy without clear and intentional
direction. Further, the rulemaking process invites input during the noticeand-comment period, affording the Bureau opportunities to consult with
bankruptcy stakeholders on development and implementation of a rule.360
In May 2019, the Bureau issued a notice of proposed rulemaking on
the FDCPA provisions governing the activities of certain debt
collectors.361 And later, in March 2020, the Bureau issued a supplemental
notice of proposed rulemaking seeking comment on proposed disclosures
relating to the collection time-barred debt.362 This initiative provides a
prime opportunity for the Bureau to craft regulations with the bankruptcy
process in mind. As Part II discusses, the debt-collection industry
355. See supra Section II.C.2. As described in Part II, the language in these orders, broadly
construed, could reach bankruptcy, but greater specificity would eliminate any room for doubt.
See supra Part II.
356. See, e.g., Encore Capital Grp., Inc., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0022, at 38–39 (broadly
prohibiting the collection of time-barred debt through “any means”).
357. See, e.g., In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 2016).
358. See, e.g., Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1415–16 (2017)
(implicitly recognizing that filing a proof of claim is a form of debt collection); Heintz v.
Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294 (1995) (“To collect a debt or claim is to obtain payment or liquidation
of it, either by personal solicitation or legal proceedings.” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
263 (6th ed. 1990))); Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014)
(“[W]e conclude that [the] filing of the proof of claim fell well within the ambit of a
‘representation’ or ‘means’ used in ‘connection with the collection of any debt.’”).
359. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511(c)(3) (2012); Kennedy et al., supra note 332, at 1155–58
(discussing the Bureau’s data-driven approach to regulation); see also 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)
(requiring Bureau monitoring for rulemaking purposes, among others).
360. See supra notes 337–62 and accompanying text.
361. See Debt Collection Practices (Regulation F), 84 Fed. Reg. 23,274, 23,274 (May 21,
2019) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006); Kelly Cochran, Fall 2018 Rulemaking Agenda,
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/fall2018-rulemaking-agenda/ [https://perma.cc/KZM3-EYHY] (stating that the debt collection
market “remains a top source of complaints to the Bureau”).
362. See Debt Collection Practices (Regulation F), 85 Fed. Reg. 12,672–12,702 (Mar. 2,
2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006).
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operates in a manner that can lead to significant non-compliance with
bankruptcy law and procedure.363 For example, when creditors assign
debt without sufficient accompanying information, debt collectors do not
have the tools to comply with bankruptcy’s requirements.364 In addition,
bankruptcy’s structural limitations provide opportunities for debt buyers
to systematically collect stale debt in bankruptcy.365 Neither the proposed
nor the supplemental proposed rules specifically address most
bankruptcy-related dimensions of the FDCPA, other than to propose that
FDCPA regulations prohibit the sale or transfer of discharged debt.366
The proposed rule would prohibit a debt collector from suing or
threatening to sue a consumer to collect a time-barred debt, but the rule
does not specify whether that ban reaches the bankruptcy process.367
Similarly, the proposed rule makes no significant changes to aspects of
the FDCPA that interface with the consumer bankruptcy process, such as
the FDCPA’s debt verification and mini-Miranda requirements,368 which
potentially intersect with the bankruptcy claims process, the automatic
stay, and the discharge. The Bureau, in consultation with the USTP,
should use the rulemaking process to address bankruptcy-specific
FDCPA violations and draft a final rule that encompasses these
bankruptcy-specific quality-control issues.
B. In the Near Term: Relying on Existing Enforcers
The recent leadership and structural changes at the Bureau place this
proposed regulatory strategy out of reach for now.369 In recent years, the
363. See supra Section III.B.2.
364. See Bruce & Sickler, Private Remedies Post-Midland, supra note 6, at 367–68.
365. See supra Section III.B.2. Indeed, as we discuss in more detail in other writings, stale
debt is currently worth more in bankruptcy than it is outside of bankruptcy, based on these
regulatory shortcomings. See Bruce & Sickler, Private Remedies Post-Midland, supra note 6, at
375.
366. Debt Collection Practices (Regulation F), 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,276.
367. See id. at 23,275–76 (“The Bureau proposes . . . [t]o prohibit, with certain exceptions,
the sale, transfer, or placement for collection of a debt if a debt collector knows or should know
that the debt has been paid or settled or has been discharged in bankruptcy, or that an identity theft
report has been filed with respect to the debt.”).
368. See id. at 23,380 (analyzing proposed provisions that prohibit unfair and misleading
debt collection practices and clarifying debt collection disclosure requirements).
369. Interim Director Mick Mulvaney attempted to rename the Bureau, redefine its mission,
and move units within the agency to diminish their work during his brief tenure. See John L.
Culhane, Jr., Mulvaney to Reorganize CFPB Office of Students and Young Consumers and Take
Other Actions, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (May 10, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance
monitor.com/2018/05/10/mulvaney-to-reorganize-cfpb-office-of-students-and-young-consumers
-and-take-other-actions/ [https://perma.cc/2LDZ-2TMV] (announcing the Office of Students and
Young Consumers and the Student Loan Ombudsman will move to the Office of Financial
Education); Renae Merle, The CFPB Tried to Change Its Name. Here’s Why it’s Giving up.,
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Bureau’s leadership has doggedly focused on reining in the Bureau’s
authority and stripping away Obama-era regulations.370 Limited
rulemaking,371 an enforcement slowdown,372 and less expansive
supervision373 characterize the agency’s current operations.374 Yet our
observations on the Bureau’s relationship with bankruptcy will hold true
into the future, when the CFPB’s leadership might be more motivated to
act. In the meantime, this Part sketches how other regulators, including
state attorneys general (SAGs) and private litigants, can serve as a
stopgap to reduce harm to consumers in bankruptcy.
WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2018, 1:47 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/12/
19/cfpb-tried-change-its-name-heres-why-its-giving-up/ [https://perma.cc/Z5GY-JGPK] (noting
the Bureau’s name did not change); see also Letter from Mick Mulvaney, Acting Dir., Consumer
Fin. Prot. Bureau, to CFPB Employees (Jan. 23, 2018) (redefining the scope of the Bureau’s
mission), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4357880-Mulvaney-Memo.html [https://
perma.cc/6RNM-CFPX]; Christopher J. Willis, Mulvaney Reorganizes CFPB Office of Fair
Lending, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com
/2018/02/01/mulvaney-reorganizes-cfpb-office-of-fair-lending/ [https://perma.cc/RVK9-P6Q6]
(describing Director Mulvaney’s internal email announcing the transfer of the Office of Fair
Lending and Equal Opportunity (OFLEO) from the Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending
Division (SEFL) to the Director’s Office to focus on advocacy, coordination, and education and
to move the Office of Consumer Response from the Operations Division to the Community
Education and Engagement Division); Introducing Our New Bureau Seal, CONSUMER FIN.
PROTECTION BUREAU (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/
introducing-our-new-bureau-seal/ [https://perma.cc/5ZYJ-BSTK] (recreating the Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection’s seal to reflect its mission).
370. See, e.g., Kate Berry, CFPB’s Mulvaney Looks to Rein in ‘Tyranny’ of Agency He Runs,
AM. BANKER (Apr. 2, 2018, 3:33 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpbs-mulvaneylooks-to-rein-in-tyranny-of-agency-he-runs [https://perma.cc/LQB8-5LUQ] (describing thendirector Mulvaney’s efforts to constrain Bureau authority); Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau Releases Notices of Proposed Rulemaking on Payday Lending, CONSUMER FIN.
PROTECTION BUREAU (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/
consumer-financial-protection-bureau-releases-notices-proposed-rulemaking-payday-lending/
[https://perma.cc/7HKM-C2NC] (proposing to rescind portions of the payday lending rule
enacted in early 2017).
371. Any substantive rulemaking is thin and limited mostly to reconsidering the payday
lending rule, HDMA data collection, and continuing work on the existing debt collection rule, per
the Bureau’s Fall 2018 rulemaking agenda. See Cochran, supra note 361.
372. See Evan Weinberger, Enforcement Slowdown Defines Mulvaney’s CFPB Tenure (1),
BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 23, 2018, 5:31 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/
enforcement-slowdown-defines-mulvaneys-cfpb-tenure-1 [https://perma.cc/DV4D-7L2T].
373. The Bureau no longer supervises banks and other entities for compliance with the
Military Lending Act after Interim Director Mulvaney determined that the Dodd-Frank Act did
not give the Bureau the authority to do so. See Glenn Thrush, Mulvaney Looks to Weaken
Oversight of Military Lending, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/08/10/us/politics/mulvaney-military-lending.html [https://perma.cc/5P7D-LJPG] (reporting
that the CFPB is suspending routine supervisory examinations for compliance with the Military
Lending Act).
374. See generally McCoy, supra note 348 (explaining how attacks on the CFPB’s
rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement powers have eroded its authority).
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States wield an arsenal of enforcement powers to fill the void left by
the Bureau’s current inactivity. State attorneys general (SAGs) have long
enforced consumer protection and are a vital partner to the federal
government in consumer financial protection.375 Moreover, the DoddFrank Act gives States concurrent power to enforce some federal
consumer financial laws against many of the entities within the Bureau’s
purview.376 SAGs’ dual enforcement authority reaches much of the
substantive law the Bureau enforces, including “the general UDAAP ban,
other federal consumer financial protection laws, and new substantive
limits on mortgage terms.”377 The Dodd-Frank Act also relaxed federal
preemption rules, expanding states’ ability to enforce laws that provide
greater protections than federal law.378 As such, state UDAP statutes
remain an important tool for ensuring consumer financial protection.379
As discussed in Part II, efforts to ensure greater compliance with general
consumer protection regulation can have pronounced spillover effects in
bankruptcy.
Private litigants, including debtors in bankruptcy and case trustees,
can also serve as a regulatory resource in times of Bureau underenforcement.380 Many of the enumerated consumer laws feature private
rights of action combined with consumer-friendly litigation incentives,
375. See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698,
707–08 (2011) (noting the unique authority SAGs have to enforce federal law). See generally
Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attorneys General After DoddFrank, 99 IOWA L. REV. 115 (2013) [hereinafter Totten, Credit Reform] (tracing the history of
states’ roles in consumer financial protection and detailing the substantive, procedural, and
remedial powers the Dodd-Frank Act gives SAGs); Mark Totten, The Enforcers & the Great
Recession, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1611 (2015) (analyzing how the concurrent powers that Congress
gave SAGs positions them as stopgaps when federal regulators fail to act, but allows them to alter
the quality of enforcement in unique ways); Amy Widman & Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys
General’s Use of Concurrent Public Enforcement Authority in Federal Consumer Protection
Laws, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 53 (2011) (examining the ways SAGs use federal consumer protection
laws); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act’s Expansion of State Authority to Protect
Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893 (2011) (explaining the numerous powers the
Dodd-Frank Act gave states to supplement the CFPB’s rulemaking and enforcement efforts).
376. 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(2)(B) (2012). There is one significant exception—States cannot
sue to enforce federal consumer financial laws against federally-chartered banks and savings
associations, but they can sue to enforce Bureau rules. Id. § 5552(a)(2)(A).
377. Totten, Credit Reform, supra note 375, at 131.
378. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 25b(b), 1465(b); Wilmarth, supra note 375, at 925–35 (explaining the
Dodd-Frank Act’s revised preemption rules).
379. See generally Prentiss Cox et al., Strategies of Public UDAP Enforcement, 55 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 37 (2018) (examining every UDAP matter resolved by state and federal enforcers in 2014
and categorizing the different approaches).
380. See Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637,
661 (2013) (discussing the use of public and private enforcement as complementary); see also
Bruce, Enforcement Gap, supra note 6, at 496–98 (discussing the role of private enforcement as
a regulatory tool in the United States); Glover, supra note 291, at 1153.
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including statutory damages and attorney’s-fee provisions.381 These
statutes encourage attorneys to pursue cases on behalf of consumers who
ordinarily cannot match the resources of their adversaries.382 As we
discuss in other writings, these provisions can fill in remedial gaps left
open by the Bankruptcy Code.383 And, as mentioned above, most courts
have held that federal consumer protection law can apply to address
bankruptcy-specific harms.384 As such, as long as the Bureau does not
perform its functions as Congress intended, bankruptcy participants can
continue to exercise any rights they might have under these laws as well
as any state UDAAPs that allow for private enforcement.
The Bureau has a vast amount of publicly available information to
guide state and private enforcers in their enforcement efforts. For
example, the Bureau has published a variety of market studies that
identify practices it believes to be harmful.385 The Bureau’s Examination
Manual, while intended for examiners, also provides a blueprint of
conduct that might pose consumer protection problems.386 Relatedly, past
Supervisory Highlights feature examples of misconduct that the Bureau
has discovered in its past examinations.387 And finally, the current
consumer complaint database aggregates narratives that consumerfinancial-protection stakeholders might search to identify patterns
involving bankruptcy-related conduct.388 State and private regulators can
mine this body of work to support their enforcement efforts.
For example, a consumer debtor’s attorney might discover an issue of
creditor non-compliance recurring in a small collection of her clients’
bankruptcy cases. She could search the Bureau’s resources to determine
whether that conduct has been identified as a problem in past examination
or market studies. These resources might also help explain market trends
that have contributed to the problem.389 The attorney could also search or
381. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1640(k)(2)(A) (2012) (codifying TILA private right of action);
id. § 1692k(a)(3) (codifying FDCPA private right of action); id. § 1691e(d) (codifying Equal
Credit Opportunity Act private right of action); id. §§ 1681i, 1681s-2(b), 1681n, 1681o (codifying
FCRA private rights of action).
382. See Bruce, Enforcement Gap, supra note 6, at 498–99.
383. Id. at 501.
384. See supra Section III.B.2.
385. See, e.g., Research and Reports, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.
consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/ [https://perma.cc/5NV7-K4MN] (“We
study how consumers interact with financial products and services to help identify potential
problems in the marketplace and achieve better outcomes for all.”).
386. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
387. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 113.
388. See supra notes 327–32 and accompanying text.
389. For example, pervasive under-compliance by third-party debt collectors might signal
that certain information has not been transferred with the assignments of those debts. See supra
Section II.B.2.c (discussing similar issues).
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browse through390 the public consumer complaint database to identify
patterns in the complaints that have so far escaped Bureau attention. And,
she or her client might also contribute their knowledge to the complaint
database to signal other regulators about the problem. In this manner, the
Bureau’s existing body of work can provide a gateway to grassroots-level
consumer protection.
CONCLUSION
Since its creation, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has
operated behind the scenes in consumer bankruptcy cases. These
activities are perhaps not surprising, considering the breadth of the
Bureau’s mission and the centrality of bankruptcy to consumer finance
law. This Article seeks to make explicit the role the Bureau plays in
bankruptcy and embrace its potential as an adjunct regulator.

390. The database is coded by topic.
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